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TIME OF ACCEPTANCE: TOO MANY
PROBLEMS FOR A SINGLE RULE *
IAN R. MACNEIL t
A Texan writes a friend in New Mexico making a business
proposal which his friend accepts by mail. A few weeks later they
have a falling out and the New Mexican refuses to go along with
the deal. The particular type of agreement involved has been held
to be against the public policy of New Mexico and relief would be
denied if New Mexican law is applicable, but it is not against the
public policy of Texas, and plaintiff would have relief if Texas law
controls.
A municipality asks for bids on a building project. A builder
sends in a low bid by mail. The appropriate municipal officers
post a letter accepting the bid. A few minutes later the builder
calls long distance and tries to withdraw his bid because of an
error in calculation. The municipality refuses to release him, and
thebuilder refuses to do the work.
The New York owner of a seldom traded corporate stock air
mails an offer to sell it at $60 a share to a San Francisco business-
man. The morning the San Franciscan receives the offer he air
mails a letter accepting it. That day there is active trading result-
* This Article is an attempt to resolve some of the problems I met in the prepa-
ration in 1961 of a report on American law for The General Principles of Law
Seminar, Cornell Law School. This seminar has been engaged for several years in
searching out the common core of agreement between various legal systems in the
area of formation of cofitract. See Schlesinger, The Common Core of Legal Systems:
An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLIcTs LAW, LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 65 (1961);
Schlesinger & Bonassies, Le fonds commun des systhmes juridiques-Observations
sur un nouveau projet de recherches, 15 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE
501 (1963).
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1950, University of Vermont;
LL.B. 1955, Harvard University. Member, New Hampshire Bar.
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ing in a decline to $40, and the San Franciscan succeeds in with-
drawing his letter from the mail.
The buyer for a Kansas City department store mails an order
for 100 dozen neckties to a jobber in New York City, delivery to
be in two months, notice of acceptance of the order to be within
two weeks. The jobber drops his acceptance of the order in a
mailbox in Greenwich Village. Through error of the post office
the acceptance goes astray. After hearing nothing for three weeks,
the buyer, assuming the jobber cannot fill the order, orders else-
where. The jobber ships the neckties on schedule and objects
strenuously when the buyer returns them.
The owner of a farm, in return for $100, gives an out-of-state
farmer an option to purchase the farm on or before June 30. On
June 30 the optionee mails his acceptance and the down payment,
which arrive in due course of the mail on July 1. The owner says
the acceptance was too late and refuses to sell.
A man mails an application for accident insurance to an insur-
ance company together with the premium for one year. The com-
pany mails the policy to him. Before he receives the policy he
loses a leg in an accident. He demands the $5,000 provided for
loss of a leg; the company refuses to pay.
Only the most abstract conceptualism could lead to the conclusion
that the foregoing situations are but one problem. Yet, in Anglo-
American law one pervasive rule, disregarding the obvious functional
differences found among the diverse problems,1 covers them all. De-
l This point is made in FuLLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 181-86 (1947), in which
are described five of the situations to which a unitary time-of-acceptance doctrine
is applied. Also, after setting forth the argument for an offeree in a case of revocation
of offer, Professor Fuller points out how little relevance it has to a case where the
acceptance is lost:
If in this case, too, the acceptance "takes effect" on dispatch it must be for
other reasons, or because it is thought wise to avoid nuances and complexi-
ties by establishing a categorical rule on the basis of policies which are
relevant in only a portion of situations to which the rule is applied.
Id. at 184; see DAWSON & HARVEY, CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT REMEDIES 410 (1959).
In addition to the six types of situations about which this Article is organized,
"time of acceptance" has been in issue in a number of other situations:
(1) Time at which parties to a contract acquire rights to property as against
claims of creditors or others contracting with regard to the same property. In
McDonald v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 610 (1899), the account of Capital
Bank with Chemical Bank was overdrawn. Capital Bank and some of its debtors
dispatched remittances for credit to the account. Before Chemical Bank received
the remittances Capital Bank was taken over by the bank examiner. The receiver
sued to recover the remittances, and the Court held for Chemical Bank. In Fitz-
gerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961), the buyer returned mer-
chandise to seller.by mail for credit on account. After dispatch the buyer went into
bankruptcy. As the case is described by the court, the return of the merchandise was
only an offer. The court mistakenly relied on the Court of Claims cases, Rhode
Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct. CI. 1955) and Dick v. United
States, 82 F. Supp 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949). In Chapman v. Mills & Gibb, 241 Fed. 715
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pending on the jurisdiction, the rule is that in a contract to be formed
at a distance an acceptance of an offer is effective either on dispatch 2
(S,D.N.Y, 1917), aff'd per ciriam, 250 Fed. 1018 (2d Cir. 1918), the debtor endorsed
and mailed checks of third parties to a creditor, then went into receivership before
the creditor received the checks. The court held that the checks belonged to the
creditor xiot the receiver. This too is an offer case. See Hatchett v. Molton, 76
Ala. 410 (1884) (successive contracts to sell the same property); Sutton Elec.
Supply Co. v, Fourth Nat'l Bank, 145 Kan. 160, 64 P.2d 34 (1937) (bank which
owed creditor was garnisheed after mailing a check in payment of the debt, but
before creditor received the check) ; Chiles V. Nelson, 7 Dana 281 (Ky. 1838) (same
as Hatcheit) ; Dick v, Vogt, 196 Okla. 66, 162 P.2d 325 (1945) (same as Hatchett);
Potter V, Sanders, 6 Hare 1, 67 Eng, Rep. 1057 (Ch. 1846) (same as Hatchett).
(2) Tile at which a drawee of a cheOe or draft becomes irrevocably bound to
pay it. A number of cases have invQlved attempts of a bank to withdraw from the
mails or otherwise revoke the acceptance of a draft or check drawn on it. Cohen
v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122 (1921); Guardian Nat'l Bank v.
Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933) ; Bohlig v, First
Natl Bank, 233 Minn. 523, 48 N.W.2d 445 (1951) ; Traders Nat'l Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920); Farmers' Guar. State Bank v.
Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S.W. 400 (Tex. Ciy. App. 1918); Canterbury v.
Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N.W. 311 (1895). These negotiable instrument
cases form a slippery foundation for generalization about other kinds of cases. See
the comment on this point in Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889, 897 (Fla. Dist.
Ct, App. 1963). The "contract" formed by the acceptance of a drawee is practically
always 4 middle step in a series of "contracts" or other relationships. The drawee
has a relationship, probably contractual, with the drawer, under which it is likely
to be under g duty to the drawer to pay properly presented checks. Moreover,
through statutes, clearing house associations, etc., the drawee bank may have certain
obligations to the collecting bank (offeror). See generally Bunn, When Is a Check
Paid?, 43 MINN. L. Rsy. 289 (1958); Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Coin-
plexity, 1952 Wis. L. Rav. 265. If the special customs and history of mercantile
transactions and law are added to the foregoing, it can be seen how unsafe it is to
jump from the negotiable instrument cases to other areas. Unfortunately, this has
not kept courts from making the leap. See, e.g., Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp.
326 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
(3) Death of a Party after sending, but before receipt, of notice of termination
of an agreement or change of beneficiary of a contract. United States v. Wadlington,
333 S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1960); Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830);
Flowers v. Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 593, 90
S.W. 526 (1905); Haarstick v. Fox, 9 Utah 110, 33 Pac. 251 (1893), aff'd, 156 U.S.
674 (1895); cf. Re Irving, [1928] 3 D.L.R. 268 (App. Div. Ont. Sup. Ct.). The
only aspect of this problem considered in this Article is in connection with life
insurance policies. See text accompanying notes 82-90 infra.
(4) Completion of a contract at an improper time, e.g., on Sunday. J. R.
Watkins Co. v. Hill, 214 Ala. 507, 108 So. 244 (1926); Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga.
438 (1875). It makes little sense to apply "contract" rules to these cases. Whether
the placing of an acceptance in a mailbox on Sunday disturbs the Sabbath hardly
seems to turn on whether months or years later a court will say that a contract had
been formed at that instant. Unfortunately, the courts may be forced by the wording
of the Sunday statute to make decisions with such a nonsensical basis. However,
surely nothing forces them to use such decisions as stare decisis when later faced
with a true contract case.
(5) Where the acceptance consists of sending property rather than simply a
communication. In these cases there may be numerous other problems, even assuming
that a contract is formed by the dispatch. For example, if the offeror revokes, does
the sender have a right to the whole price promised him, or only to damages, thus
being treated as still owning what he sent? Under what circumstances can the offeree
stop the property in transit and get it back, and what are his rights when he does?
Who bears the loss if the property is delayed, damaged, or destroyed in transit? As
of what time does the property belong to the respective parties in connection with
claims of creditors or other third parties? While these problems are very properly
problems of formation of contract, they are too extensive to receive anything but a
passing mention here.
2This oversimplification of the rule should not be misleading in the context of
this Article. The numerous exceptions clustered around questions concerning the
950 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:947
or receipt.3 Neither of these rules is adequate to achieve the goals of
contract law. Those goals demand more flexibility than can be pro-
vided by a simple "dispatch" rule or a simple "receipt" rule. The
purpose of this Article is to demonstrate how that flexibility could
be achieved, and, incidentally, how the courts already often achieve
it without admitting to doing so. Another purpose is to show that
the dispatch rule, often under attack on theoretical grounds,4 is a
sound foundation upon which to base needed flexibility.
I. JURISDICTION, VENUE, OR CHOICE OF LAW
The substance of these cases is outside the scope of this Article,
but they nevertheless require brief mention. For one thing, they
illustrate, perhaps more than any other group of cases, the absurdity
of applying a time-of-acceptance rule outside its functional setting. The
problems of risks of transmission delays, of mistakes, of changing
markets, of the burning of almost "insured" houses, etc., simply do
not bear any functional relationship to the questions of jurisdiction
or choice of law involved in the conflicts 5 cases when a court asks:
"Where was the contract made?" Shurter v. Ricker' is a good illus-
tration. A married woman living in New York made an offer by
mail to a friend in Texas. He accepted the offer by telegram. If
Texas law were applicable, the contract was unenforceable; if New
means of transmission of the acceptance and alleged requirements by the offeror of
actual receipt are a part of hornbook law. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS § 28 (1954). Those
exceptions based on the means of transmission occur in the gaps created by the
various theoretical justifications for the dispatch theory. For example, if the only
justification of the dispatch rule recognized by a court is that by using the mail an
offeror makes the postal authorities his agent, then a telegraphed response to a mailed
offer cannot be effective on dispatch. At least this is the case so long as the same
legal entity does not operate both the mails and telegraph services. These technical
exceptions to the dispatch rule have not been overtly recognized by the courts as
growing out of differences in functional problems and theoretically are largely un-
responsive to the various functional problems considered here. It is my belief, how-
ever, that in practice these technical exceptions are often unconsciously used by the
courts to accomplish functional purposes.
3The United States Court of Claims is the only American court currently clearly
adhering generally to the "receipt rule." Pacific Alaska Contractors v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 844 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 128 F.
Supp. 417 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949);
cf. Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961).
4 Samek, A Reassessment of the Present Ride Relating to Postal Acceptance,
35 AuSTL. L.J. 38 (1961) ; Stimson, Effective Time of an Acceptance, 23 MINN. L.
REv. 776 (1939) ; Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q. REV. 499
(1939). For a list of earlier criticisms see Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the
Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLulf. L. REv. 920 (1936).
Too much well-worked ground would be harrowed anew by examination of the
theoretical arguments which have been advanced generally in support of the dispatch
rule. The fallacies in those arguments have been exposed many times. But the
weakness in theoretical arguments does not undermine the functional bases for the
rule which are discussed in various parts of this Article.
5 For simplicity's sake, all the choice of law, jurisdiction, and venue cases will
be called conflicts cases.
662 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 732 (1933).
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York law were applicable, it was enforceable. The court held that
because the offeree used a different means of communication from
that used by the offeror, the acceptance was only effective on receipt,
and therefore the contract was made in New York and subject to
New York law. The court, however, suggested that if the offeree had
mailed his acceptance it would have been effective on dispatch, the
agreement would have been made in Texas, Texas law would have
applied, and the contract would have been unenforceable. It is rather
difficult to see how the gallant interest of Texas in protecting married
women from making ill-considered contracts is in any way reduced
if an acceptance is sent by telegram or increased if an acceptance is
sent by mail.
The second reason for mentioning the conflicts cases is that un-
fortunately they are very much alive. Under the influence of Beale
and the first Restatement of Conflicts,7 the "place of making" gained
decisive importance, it being assumed that a contract could be formed
in one place only. Fortunately, in the conflicts field itself the trend is
very much away from such mechanistic rules. More modern rules are
evolving from the notion that the key questions concern the location
of the most substantial contacts of the contract.' Under this notion,
one contact is the place where the acceptance is sent, another is where
it is received. The contact is the same irrespective of which event
"creates" the contract. However, even assuming the substantial
contacts doctrine will sweep every court in the nation, there will re-
main a vast body of old conflicts cases holding that a particular con-
tract is formed upon dispatch or upon receipt as the case may be.
These cases will be dead for conflicts purposes, but they may be kept
alive by unwary jurists and other legal scholars for contract purposes.
That this is a distinct possibility is shown by the ease with which the
courts and some textwriters have in the past jumped blissfully from
one type of case to the other, and back again.9 Thus, the mechanistic
conflicts cases may plague contract law long after they have been
deservedly interred by the conflicts experts."0
7See generally RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8 (1934).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 8 (1958) ; EHPENZWEIG, CoN-
FLIcT OF LAWS 453-540 (1962).
9 See, e.g., Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. [1955] 2 All E.R. 493 (C.A.);
1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 81, at 266 (3d ed. 1957) (numerous cases for the dispatch
rule cited without distinguishing between "contract" cases and "conflict" cases).
Most of the cases involving telephoned acceptance or other acceptances made by
instantaneous methods of communication are and will be "conflict" cases. For a
collection of the instantaneous transmission cases, see 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 79
(1963); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 82A (3d ed. 1957).
10 This Article deals with contract law and not with conflict of laws problems.
Therefore, the strictly conflict of laws cases will hereafter be ignored, since they are
not fungible with the contract law cases. When reference is made to "one case" or
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I. REVOCATION OF OFFER AFTER DISPATCH BUT BEFORE
RECEIPT OF ACCEPTANCE
Of all the "time of acceptance" situations, the case for the offeror
is least appealing when he tries to revoke his offer after dispatch of
the acceptance. The offeror initially made the promise. Not only did
that promise create expectations of performance in the offeree, there is
substantial possibility that he in some way relied on the promise.
Moreover, his reliance may have taken a form, e.g., inaction, which he
will be unable to prove successfully in court. These expectations and
this reliance may occur even before the offeree dispatches his acceptance,
since the only apparent condition to the offeror's being bound is the
offeree's accepting, and he is likely to think of that as something fully
in his control. Some legal systems protect these interests of the offeree
before he dispatches the acceptance. For example, German law gen-
erally makes offers irrevocable." Other civil law systems protect at
least the reliance interest by the doctrine of culpa-in-contrahendo.'
Except for limited and recent American developments in the doctrine
of promissory estoppel 13 and a handful of statutory provisions of
"a few cases," the reader should understand that no strictly conflict case is included.
However, since the courts commonly treat conflict and contract cases as fungible,
anyone trying to sense a trend in a particular jurisdiction cannot afford to give the
conflict cases so cavalier a treatment. Indeed, if there appeared to be a trend,
especially in the newer conflict cases, toward or away from the dispatch rule, they
could not be discarded even in a general Article like this. My review of the many
conflict cases showed no particular trend differing from the contract cases, and I
feel some confidence in putting them aside. Although no special effort was made
to search out these cases, such a cascade of them emerged from other research that
no purpose would be served by their extensive citation. However, in view of the
notoriety of the Court of Claims cases in 1949 and 1955, see text accompanying
notes 21-26 infra, rejecting the dispatch rule, it is interesting to note that the conflicts
cases found since 1949 still adhere stoutly to the dispatch rule. See Roto-Lith, Ltd.
v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) ; Packard Englewood Motors,
Inc. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 215 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1954); Hunt Truck Sales
& Service Inc. v. Omaha Standard, 187 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Iowa 1960) (receipt rule
applied because answer to a mailed offer was telegraphed, but court does not show
any inclination to undermine dispatch rule generally); Walrus Mfg. Co. v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 184 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Ill. 1960) ; Rosenberg v. Andrew Weir
Ins. Co., 154 F. Supp. 6 (D. Md. 1957); Joseph v. Krull Wholesale Drug Co., 147
F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1957); Compania de
Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357, 108 A.2d 372 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955) (receipt rule applied pursuant to option exception
to dispatch rule); Linn v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958) ; Anschell v. Sackheim, 145 F. Supp. 447 (D.N.J. 1956) (dictum) ; Sam Fin-
man, Inc. v. Rokuz Holding Corp., 130 Cal. App. 2d 758, 279 P.2d 982 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955) (dictum); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 125 N.W.2d 191 (Neb. 1963) (dictum)
(not a conflicts case).
31 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 923. See generally Kessler & Fine, Culpa in
Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401 (1964).
12 Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 924-25.
13 Where the offer is for a return promise, and is stated to be irrevocable, or
called a firm offer, or it is otherwise made clear that the offer is accompanied by a
promise not to revoke, reasonable reliance before acceptance would very likely make
the offer irrevocable. Cf. R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Albert, 79 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.
La. 1948), rev'd, 176 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Harris v. Lillis, 24 So. 2d 689 (La.
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limited application,14 the inexorable logic of the consideration dogma
has prevented similar protection in Anglo-American law. The ex-
pectation and reliance interests 15 of the offeree thus being naked to
the whims of the offeror prior to acceptance, it is not surprising that
the Anglo-American courts have kept that period of nakedness as
short as possible by adoption of the dispatch rule. Indeed, it may be
said that one of the prime functions of the dispatch rule is to shorten
the duration of the offeror's right to revoke."0 Moreover, not only
does the dispatch rule shorten the period of revocability, it removes
an element of uncertainty from the contract relationship. In most
Anglo-American jurisdictions a revocation is effective only upon
receipt.' 7  The offeree in close cases has no idea whether he received
the revocation before or after the offeror received the acceptance. Un-
der the receipt rule that question is of vital importance, but under the
dispatch rule the offeree will generally know whether he received the
revocation before or after dispatching the acceptance. The offeror,
of course, is in doubt under either rule. Thus, the dispatch rule pro-
tects the offeree from uncertainty which is caused by somewhat un-
desirable conduct of the offeror. Perhaps influenced by such con-
siderations, numerous decisions have held the dispatch of an acceptance
App. 1946); RESTATEMENT, CONRACITS §§45, 90 (1932). Moreover, a number of
cases have indicated that the offer becomes irrevocable by virtue of a contractor's
reliance on a subcontractor's bid, even though the bid does not indicate any intent that
it be irrevocable. Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1941) (dictum); Air Conditioning Co. v. Richard Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 167 (D.
Hawaii 1961), affd, 318 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1963) (court of appeals expressed doubt
on this point) ; Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958);
Northwestern Eng'r Co. v. Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397, 10 N.W.2d 879 (1943). Contra,
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
14 N.Y. PErs. PROP. LAW § 33; UNIFORM COMMtRCIAL CODE § 2-205; MODEL
WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS AcT § 1.
15 Expectation and reliance interests are used in the sense developed in the land-
mark article on this subject, Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-37).
16This notion, advanced by Professor Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 925-27, has
been criticized.
Whether or not an offer should remain irrevocable for a certain time, although
no consideration for keeping it open has been given is an entirely different
question. The present rule relating to acceptance by letter must be supported
on its own merits, and not on the merits of a rule which the common law has
not adopted.
Samek, supra note 4, at 42. This criticism is erroneous. The questions referred to
are not "entirely different" questions; they are exactly the same question: When does
the offeror lose his right to withdraw from the proposed transaction? Some civil-lav
systems, e.g., Germany, would answer that the offeror loses his right to withdraw as
soon as he communicates the offer. Anglo-American law would commonly answer
that he loses it as soon as an acceptance is dispatched.
The purported favoring in American law of the receipt rule in option contracts
in other situations, see text at notes 78-80 infra, suggests further support for Professor
Nussbaum's position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 64, comment f
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964).
17 1 CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 39 (1963); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 56 (3d ed.
1957).
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proof against revocation by the offeror."5 The cases have so held even
when it was clear that there was no reliance by the offeree before or
after the dispatch of acceptance and the time of receipt of the
revocation. 9
The only2 ' important exception to this line of authority has been
where the offeror has made a mistake. Both the widely noted cases
Is Patrick v. Bowman, 149 U.S. 411 (1893) (revocation never received, but sent
before acceptance) ; United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1958) (revocation because of alleged mistake in
a bid); Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Collier White Lead Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 447
(No. 9635) (C.C.D. Minn. 1876) (dictum); McCleskey & Whitman v. Howell Cotton
Co., 147 Ala. 573, 42 So. 67 (1906) (offeree relied by reselling after sending ac-
ceptance); Kempner v. Cohn, 47 Ark. 519, 1 S.W. 869 (1886); Carlsen v. Hay, 69
Colo. 485, 195 Pac. 103 (1921); L. & E. Wertheimer, Inc. v. Wehle-Hartford Co.,
126 Conn. 30, 9 A.2d 279 (1939) (offeree had a contract to resell the subject matter
of the contract in question) ; Wagner v. McClay, 306 Ill. 560, 138 N.E. 164 (1923) ;
Ziehme v. Mclnerney, 167 Ill. App. 577 (1912) (shipment of goods) ; Port Huron
Mach. Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa 826, 221 N.W. 843 (1928) (shipment of goods was
the acceptance) ; Cyrus W. Scott Mfg. Co. v. Stoma, 10 La. App. 469, 121 So. 335
(1929) (dictum) ; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99 (1869) (no obvious reliance by offeree) ;
Logan v. Waddle, 238 S.W. 516 (Mo. App. 1922) (unclear whether offeree relied by
agreeing to resell the subject matter of the contract in issue after sending acceptance) ;
Senaca Co. v. Ellison, 203 Mo. App. 179, 184 S.W. 1177, 208 S.W. 103 (1919)
(dictum) (shipment of goods); Stein-Gray Drug Co. v. H. Michelsen Co., 116 N.Y.
Supp. 789 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1909) (dictum); Owen M. Bruner Co. v. Standard
Lumber Co., 63 Pa. Super. 283 (1916) (offeree apparently resold the subject matter
of the contract between dispatch of acceptance and receipt of revocation) ; Felt &
Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Northwestern Egg & Poultry Co., 178 Wis. 552, 190 N.W. 431
(1922) ; In re Imperial Land Co. (Harris' case), L.R. 7 Ch. 587 (1872) (reliance of
offeree unclear, but case illustrative of the situations in which there might be reliance
that could not be proven) ; Raeburn & Verel v. Burness & Sons, 11 T.L.R. 399 (Q.B.
1895) ; In re Imperial Land Co. (Wall's case), L.R. 15 Eq. 18 (1872) ; Henthorn v.
Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27; Stevenson, Jacques & Co. v. McLean, L.R. 5 Q.B.D. 346
(1880); Sommerville v. Rice, 31 N.Z.L.R. 370 (1911); Thomson v. James, 34 Sess.
Cas. 1 (Scot. 1st Div. 1855); cf. The Palo Alto, 18 Fed. Cas. 1062 (No. 10700)
(D. Me. 1847) (revocation of remission of a customs forfeiture held too late where
received after court ordered restoration of the property).
'9 Stephen M. Weld & Co. v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 Fed. 770 (E.D.N.C. 1913)
(court even allowed recovery of damages occurring after the revocation was received,
on the dubious ground that since the revocation was only an anticipatory breach the
offeree could elect to stand by the contract, continue its performance, and collect its
losses in doing so); Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Gehring, 283 Ill. App.
581 (1936) ; Cobb v. Foree, 38 IIl. App. 255 (1890) ; Peck v. Freeze, 101 Mich. 321,
59 N.W. 600 (1894); Berwald Stewart Co. v. Mitchell, 37 Ohio App. 121, 174 N.E.
148 (1930) (suit by a broker for commission, offeree arguing unsuccessfully for
receipt rule) ; Farmers' Produce Co. v. McAlester Storage & Comm'n Co., 48 Okla.
488, 150 Pac. 483 (1915) (statutory provision assisted the court; offeror revoked
because it discovered that it had insufficient supplies to meet offeree's order).
20 A second arguable line of exceptions is to be found in a number of cases which
have approved the dispatch rule, but have gone on to find that no contract had been
formed because the acceptance was not unqualified. In some the difference between
the terms of the acceptance and the terms of the offer was so slight that one wonders
if the real reason for the result was perhaps judicial dissatisfaction with the dispatch
rule. See, e.g., Anderson v. Stewart, 149 Neb. 660, 32 N.W.2d 140 (1948) ; Polhamus
v. Roberts, 50 N.M. 236, 175 P.2d 196 (1946); Hess v. Holt Lumber Co., 175 Wis.
451, 185 N.W. 522 (1921). Avoidance of a charge of historical ignorance also
requires a mention here of M'Culloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 278
(1822), in which Massachusetts rejected the dispatch rule. This case is now dubious
authority in Massachusetts, see Brauer v. Shaw, 168 Mass. 198, 46 N.E. 617 (1897),
although Dean Stimson argues that M'Culoch is still good law there. Stimson,
supra note 4, at 799 n.12. Incidentally, it is interesting to note that in M'Culloch
apparently there was no reliance by the offeree between the time of dispatch and the
time of receipt. A note by the reporter of the case suggests that possibly a different
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in the Court of Claims, Dick v. United States2' and Rhode Island
Tool Co. v. United States,12 were cases involving substantial unilateral
mistakes. Instead of facing up to the functional problem of mistake,
each time the court repudiated the dispatch rule generally.2  This ap-
proach to the problem was undoubtedly encouraged by the extreme
weakness of the reasons in support of the dispatch rule usually put
forth in cases and texts.24 Such a repudiation was not, however,
necessary. The state of the law of mistake would have permitted relief
in those cases without overthrowing the dispatch rule.2" Moreover, in
Rhode Island Tool the court lost a good opportunity to recognize that
an offeror calling a mistake to the attention of the offeree before
receipt of the acceptance is probably entitled to better treatment than
if he makes his play after receiving the acceptance. In any attempted
rescission for mistake there is always a possibility that the one claiming
relief is dissatisfied with the contract for other reasons and is using
the mistake as an excuse, or indeed is trumping up the mistake. The
notion of certainty of contracts to which judges habitually refer in
denying relief for mistake rests in part on this always present possi-
bility of duplicity. But such conduct is less dangerous when the party
seeking relief is not aware that a contract has been formed. If he
result might be reached if there were such reliance. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) at 283. One
of the few other revocation-of-offer cases applying the receipt rule is McCone v.
Eccles, 42 Nev. 451, 181 Pac. 134 (1919). An offer of modification of an earlier
contract provided for the offeree's signing of notes and that "upon their return,
[offeror] will attend to the matter of a bill of sale." Id. at 454, 181 Pac. at 135. It
is arguable that the offeror required receipt but certainly not in unequivocal terms.
2182 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949), 13 ALBANY L. REv. 94 (1949), 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 632 (1949), 38 GEO. L.J. 106 (1949), 62 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1949), 44 ILL.
L. REV. 394 (1949), 25 I~n. L.J. 202 (1950), 34 MINN. L. REv. 140 (1950), 17 U.
CHI. L. REv.. 375 (1949), 18 U. CINc. L. REv. 381 (1949), 35 VA. L. REv. 508 (1949),
59 YALE L.J. 374 (1950). Dick will be considered in more detail later, since it involved
not a revocation by the offeror, but a withdrawal of an acceptance by an offeree.
22128 F. Supp. 417 (Ct Cl. 1955), 43 GEo. L.J. 679 (1955), 54 MIcH. L. REv.
557 (1956), 8 STAN. L. REv. 279 (1956), 7 W. REs. L. REv. 103 (1955).
23This repudiation has had unfortunate effects. In Pacific Alaska Contractors,
Inc. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 844 (Ct Cl. 1958), the court, without noting the
difference, extended the rule of Rhode Island Tool to a non-mistake case, compounding
its error by indicating that a revocation is effective on dispatch. Id. at 846. Dick
and Rhode Island Tool seem to have vigor only in the house of their fathers. Only
one other court has taken their lead, although as the reader will note from citations
throughout this article a number of time-of-acceptance cases have come down since
1949. One of these involved an alleged mistake in a bid for a federal government
contract, in which the court was unaware of or disregarded Dick and Rhode Island
Tool. United States v. Sabin Metal Corp., 151 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 253 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1958). The case purporting to follow Dick and
Rhode Island Tool is Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961),
although the court was in reality dealing with an offer, not an acceptance. The
lower court in Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963),
followed Dick but was reversed on appeal.
24 See the criticisms in the materials cited in note 1 supra.
25 For example, see Kutsche v. Ford, 222 Mich. 442, 192 N.W. 714 (1923), in
which the court adopted the dispatch rule, but gave relief for a unilateral mistake
by the offeree where he notified the offeror of the mistake before receiving notice
of acceptance. See generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 609 (1960) ; PALMER, MISTAKE
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1962).
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knows that a contract has been formed, there is a danger that he is
simply speculating at the other party's expense. If the contract looks
favorable to him he will abide by it; if it begins to look sour he will
trot out his mistake calling "Foul !" But he does not have this oppor-
tunity if the other party is not bound. The danger of a conscious at-
tempt to speculate does not exist when the offeror still thinks that
he is the only one even partially bound to the deal. Thus, one factor
which surely should be weighed in the offeror's favor in a mistake case
is his absence of knowledge of the acceptance. This is not to suggest
that the offeror's absence of knowledge be given conclusive weight.
The other elements of certainty may and often do far outweigh the
element of injurious speculation. The key element in certainty is the
need of the party later resisting rescission to be able to rely on the
promise of the other. Thus, presence or absence of change of position
by the party seeking to uphold the contract may properly dominate
the picture, even though the erring party did not know of the forma-
tion of the contract. Moreover, it is essential to ascertain whether the
offeror in fact knew of the acceptance when he protested. Courts
would not err in being suspicious in such cases, especially if there has
been competitive bidding. The maintenance of the integrity of com-
petitive bidding systems is both an essential and a difficult task. There
is some evidence that mistakes are used to nibble away at the integrity
of government competitive bidding.26 Often the offeror-bidder will
know precisely when the bids are to be opened, and thus when the
acceptance, if there is one, is likely to be dispatched. The possibility of
his learning of the award, of the range of bids, or of other information
from an inside source some time before receipt of the formal acceptance
should induce caution by the courts in weighing claims of ignorance
of the acceptance.
In summary, it is difficult to see any practical reason why the
courts should allow an offeror to revoke after dispatch of the accept-
ance, except in mistake cases, and then only cautiously, especially
26 Gantt, Selected Government Contract Problems: Construction Contract Stand-
ard Forms "Mistakes in Bids" Revisited, 14 Fed. B.J. 388, 400 (1954). It is by no
means unknown for government bidders who allege mistakes to seek initially an
increase in the price rather than rescission of the contract. See Rumley v. United
States, 285 F.2d 773 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (offeror-bidder wrote concerning his mistake
before he knew of the award; the court refused rescission).
In a matter closely related to the subject of this Article, the Government has
recently tightened its regulations. Various procurement regulations, e.g., 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-2.303 (1963), permit a contracting officer to consider bids received before an
award is made, but after the opening of the bids, where the tardiness is due to delay
in the mails for which the bidder was not responsible. Under older regulations, such
consideration could be given to bids sent by ordinary mail, thus giving rise to such
possibilities as the use of easily rigged postage meter dates as evidence of time of
mailing. The newer regulations limit this special provision for late bids to those
sent by certified or registered mail, thus making fraudulent claims of delay in the
mails more difficult to effect.
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because the possible reliance of the offeree calls for protection beyond
that which promissory estoppel ordinarily gives.
III. WITHDRAWAL OF ACCEPTANCE FROM TRANSMISSION OR NOTICE
OF REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE RECEIVED BEFORE OR AT THE
SAME TIME AS THE ACCEPTANCE
The relations of the parties are quite different in these situations
than when the offeror revokes. In the revocation of offer cases the
problem is the possible or actual reliance of the offeree after sending
his acceptance. Here, however, it is the offeree who "wants out," and
here reasonable reliance by the offeror is impossible, since he knows
before or at the time of receiving the acceptance that the offeree with-
draws his promise. Reliance would be reasonable only if the law says
it is, and even then the law would normally limit its definition of
reasonableness by the doctrine of mitigation of damages. Thus, there
is no obvious counterpart to the offeree's reasonable reliance in the
revocation of offer cases. If the offeree is unable effectively to
terminate his acceptance after dispatch, some other reason must be
found.
A one-sided arrangement is created if the offeror loses his power
to revoke at the time of dispatch, while the offeree retains both the
physical ability and legal power to withdraw or revoke the acceptance
before its receipt. This situation suggests three possible solutions:
make the acceptance effective only upon receipt; deprive the offeree of
the legal power to terminate his acceptance after dispatch even though
he may retain the physical power to get it back or to communicate by
a faster means; or effectuate the one-sided arrangement.
The first solution may have been the one adopted by the Court
of Claims in Dick v. United States,2 7 the reason given being the al-
leged change in American postal regulations 28  permitting with-
2782 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl. 1949). It is not completely clear whether the court
adopted this solution or the third rule suggested. In Rhode Island Tool and subse-
quent Court of Claims cases the Court of Claims treats Dick as adopting the first
solution.
28 In Rhode Island Tool the court states that it knows of no decision in favor
of the dispatch rule since the effective date of the new regulations where the new
regulations were called to the attention of the court. The statement is an unfortunate
one. The regulations could hardly be described as new. There is no clear agreement
as to when such regulations came into effect, because the right to withdraw letters
has been expanded over the years. Thus Dawson and Harvey put the date at 1885.
DAWSON & HARVEY, CONTRACTS AND CONTRACT REMEoIEs 409 (1959). American
Jurisprudence puts it at least 1887 or earlier. 12 Am. JUR. Contracts § 49, at 541
(1938). However, there were some rights to withdraw a letter as early as 1873.
Note, 8 STAN. L. REj. 279, 281 (1956). At any rate, the regulations antedate some
cases in which the courts applied the dispatch rule where the letter had in fact
been withdrawn. Scottish-Am. Mortgage Co. v. Davis, 96 Tex. 504, 74 S.W. 17
(1903) ; Farmers' Guar. State Bank v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S.W. 400
(Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Canterbury v. Bank of Sparta, 91 Wis. 53, 64 N.W. 311
(1895). In at least two cases prior to 1949 the courts applied the dispatch rule after
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drawal of posted mail by the sender. To the extent that this reason
assumes that the dispatch rule is based on the idea that the carrier is
agent of the offeror it is attacking a straw man. The dispatch rule
does not depend on the oft-destroyed agency concept.2 9 It has sounder
functional foundations, some of which have already been discussed.
To the extent that the dispatch rule presupposes some loss of
control by the offeree, further discussion is required. Speaking
broadly, there are two reasons why the acceptance of an offer should
be communicated to the offeror. If the offeror does not know about
the acceptance he will not know that he has obligations and will be
unable to perform them. In addition, without communication there
may be no evidence other than the unsupported word of the offeree
that he intended to be bound to the contract. Both these points will be
considered in connection with acceptances which are never received or
are delayed in transmission. The second, however, also involves the
problem of control which so concerned the Court of Claims. The
question is whether the dispatch of an acceptance by means of the
mail, telegraph, etc., is a manifestation of intent adequate to protect
the offeror from denials by the offeree that he manifested such an
intent. The answer is not clear."0  Obviously, the mere fact that the
offeree could communicate an overtaking revocation of the acceptance
by telephone, or other mode of communication, does not affect this
question, since in most cases the offeror would still receive the accept-
ance. But what of the offeree's power to remove the acceptance
physically from the channel of communication, so that the offeror
never receives it? It is not hard to think of cases where the offeror
would never learn of the acceptance, and yet would have been bound,
under the dispatch rule, had things turned sour for him rather than
for the offeree. In such a case the offeree may have been speculating
for a time with the offeror's money. There are several answers to
this problem, which seem a sufficient basis for rejecting the approach
explicit consideration of the right of the sender to withdraw the letter from the mail.
Chapman v. Mills & Gibb, 241 Fed. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd mem., 250 Fed. 1018
(2d Cir. 1918); Sutton Elec. Supply Co. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 145 Kan. 160, 64
P2d 34 (1937).
29 See note 4 supra.
30 Professor Williston expresses doubts on this question:
If the law is open to criticism for taking the moment of mailing a letter as
important, it is because that outward act is not so certain an outward indi-
cation that a promise has been made as a receipt of the letter by the offeror
would be, and the law should select such an outward act as normally and
ordinarily connotes the actual making of a promise by communication.
1 WILLISTON, COxTRACTS § 81, at 269 (3d ed. 1957). Certainly some forms of "dis-
patch" are not adequate for this purpose, and the courts will not treat them as effective
acceptances. E.g., Maclay v. Harvey, 90 Ill. 525 (1878) (giving a letter to a boy
to mail); Bal v. van Staden, [1902] Transvaal L.R. 128 (1901) (mailing when,
because of wartime conditions, there was no regular postal communication between
the offeree's and the offeror's places of residence). The point is ably discussed in
Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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of Dick. Neither the physical power of the offeree to withdraw a
communication nor the duration of that power must be overestimated.
Anyone who has tried to retrieve a letter or package from the mails is
aware of the difficulties of doing so, difficulties compounded by vast
quantities of other mail, by lack of tracing facilities, by dispersal of
bureaucratic authority, by the natural reluctance of those trained to
speed mail onward to make any of it go backward.3 In short, what-
ever the postal regulations may say, the offeree has lost a great deal
of control over the acceptance when he drops it through a letter slot.
Moreover, if the offeror has an inkling of what happened, he may be
able to prove that the acceptance was sent. Telegraph companies keep
duplicate copies of telegrams. Order or sales forms and checks are
commonly serially numbered, and subject to discovery procedures. A
man who will withdraw an acceptance from the mail will not neces-
sarily lie under oath when his deposition is taken.3 2 Finally, the most
important answer is that the dispatch rule is sufficiently valuable and
useful that it should not be overthrown for an occasional instance of
injustice.
A second possible handling of revocations of acceptance is to hold
that the acceptance is effective on dispatch and is irrevocable.' This
answer has whatever virtue there is in symmetry, in that it is com-
pletely consistent with the rule respecting revocation of offers after
dispatch of the acceptance. It also has a more useful virtue in that it
prevents, during the period of transmission, any possibility of specula-
tion by the offeree at the offeror's expense.
The third solution is to permit the offeree to withdraw his
acceptance or notify the offeror of its revocation, at any time up to or
31 Professor Pannam reports trying six times to retrieve letters from Her Maj-
esty's post under the Australian regulations, each time unsuccessfully. Pannam,Postal Regulation 289 and Acceptance of an Offer by Post, 2 MELBOURNE U.L. REV.
388 (1960). There has been judicial recognition that in spite of a right to withdraw
the letter the sender loses control over it upon mailing. Chapman v. Mills & Gibb,
241 Fed. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), aff'd nem., 250 Fed. 1018 (2d Cir. 1918).
32 It may also be possible to secure information from the post office concerning
the fact that a letter addressed to the offeror was withdrawn from the mails. Re-
quests for withdrawal of mail must be made on a special form, 39 C.F.R. §§ 43.5,
51.8, 137 (1962), which is kept by. the post office. However, records regarding mail
matters "are privileged matter, and may not be disclosed by subordinate officers, or
employees of the Department without authorization." 39 C.F.R. §4.3 (1962). Thus,
the offeror may have some difficulty in breaking this barrier of silence. It is not
clear from the regulations whether department authorization would be granted an
offeror in such a case. 39 C.F.R. § 4.4 (1962). On the subject of privilege in mail
and telegraph matter generally, see 8 WImGORE, EVIDENCE §2287 (McNaughton ed.
1961).
33 In the following cases the dispatch rule was applied either to a withdrawal of
the acceptance or to an overtaking revocation of the acceptance: Cohen v. First Nat'l
Bank, 22 Ariz. 394, 198 Pac. 122 (1921) (check case) ; Morrison v. Thoelke, 155
So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) ; Sutton Elec. Supply Co. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank,
145 Kan. 160, 64 P.2d 34 (1937); Farmers' Guar. State Bank v. Burrus Mill &
Elevator Co., 207 S.W. 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
1964]
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contemporaneous with receipt. 4  At first glimpse it seems atrocious
to bind one party but not the other.s And so it is whenever the
subject matter of the contract is such that the offeree can enjoy any
material opportunity to speculate at no risk to himself.30 But it is
questionable whether there is anything more than a love of legal
symmetry to justify refusing to allow an offeree to change his mind
in the following cases:
A wealthy man writes to a prominent artist offering him $10,000
if the artist will paint a mural on the living room wall of the man's
mansion. The artist mails an affirmative reply, but shortly there-
after has an opportunity to work in Europe, and telegraphs a
rejection which reaches the offeror before the acceptance.
A man sends in a health insurance application, the policy to be
noncancellable to age 65. The company mails the policy. Shortly
thereafter a directive comes to the underwriting section not to
issue such policies to people engaged in the applicant's occupation.
The company recovers the policy from the post office, and there-
after mails a rejection. The applicant's health remains the same
until after he has received the rejection.
When the subject matter of the contract is something not likely to
fluctuate in value during the period of transmission, nor the type of
commodity likely to be resold, there seems singularly little reason to
bind the offeree as soon as he dispatches the acceptance, even though
the offeror is bound at that point.3 7 The purposes underlying mutuality
34 The Tennessee court adopted this position in Traders' Nat'l Bank v. First
Nat'l Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920) (check case, see caveat, supra
note 1). In Linn v. McLean, 80 Ala. 360 (1885), the court held that a mailed
acceptance could be revoked before receipt because the parties generally dealt face
to face. The court went on to hold that the purported revocation was inadequate.
35 The dissenting judge in Dick said: "I think little can be said in justification
of such a doctrine." 82 F. Supp. at 331. Professor Llewellyn points out:
regarding the time of closing, the risk of the market shifting against the
offeror, unbalanced by the chance of gain if it shifts in his favor, rests under
our law on the offeror during one transmission period plus time for answer
. . . . He wants to deal; he takes that risk. But to fail to close the deal as
against the offeree until the letter of agreement arrives is to extend that
imbalanced risk of the market without observable reason. We have seen that
it will be rough on the offeree if he is not permitted to rely on having obli-
gated the offeror; but it will be even rougher on the offeror if he is obligated
whereas the offeree, at the offeree's option, is not-when there is no reason
for the inequality. It is not a question of principle that both must be bound,
or neither; it is a question of principle that there must be a good reason for
"binding" one while leaving the other free.
Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J.
779, 795 n.23 (1939).
36 The Indian Contract Act of 1872, § 5, 2 UNREPEALED GENERAL AcTs 275 (4th
ed. 1909), gives the offeree power to do precisely this. See Saxena, Selected Modern
Problems in Offer and Acceptance: A Comparative Study of the Law of India,
England and the United States 157 (1961) (unpublished thesis in Cornell Law
Library).
37 Professor Winfield, while not advocating the one-sided obligation argued for
here did suggest that, "There is something to be said for adopting different rules for
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doctrines simply do not apply to- such cases. It is interesting to note
that of the few modern cases which have rejected the dispatch rule in
whole or in part under the "new" postal regulations, three have in-
volved withdrawals of acceptance. Two of these were check collection
cases,as in which drawee banks mailed drafts or letters of advice and
credit to the collecting bank, but then withdrew the communication
from the mail. These specialized types of contracts do not involve a
subject matter which appears to permit the offeree (drawee-bank) to
speculate at the offeror's (collecting bank's) expense. They are,
therefore, appropriate cases in which to permit the drawee bank to
revoke its acceptance." The other modem case applying the receipt
rule to withdrawals of acceptance is Dick, which involved a wartime
contract to supply ship propellers. It was not an open bid contract,
but was individually negotiated. Two factors stand out: the mistake
made by the offeree was so great that it seems most unlikely that it
was trying either to speculate or to trade the Government up; and in
view of the special nature of the ship propellers and of the wartime
situation, it is inconceivable that the offeree was trying to hold open
this deal while shopping around for something better elsewhere."
In contrast to the facts of the three cases holding the offeree
unbound after dispatch are the facts of several cases holding him
bound. One involved an offer to sell farm machinery, with the buyer
to receive credit of $1,078 for an engine to be turned in to the seller,
together with a rescission of an earlier contract whereby the seller was
different species of contracts. In a purely personal contract, like that originating in
a proposal of marriage, it might well be urged that until the offeror actually receives
the acceptance, there ought to be no contract, however well suited the Anglo-American
view might be to commercial contracts." Winfield, supra note 4, at 512.
38 Guardian Nat'1 Bank v. Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187
N.E. 388 (1933) ; Traders' Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W.
977 (1920). See the caveat in note 1 supra, about using check collection or draft
cases as authority in other areas. Buehler v. Galt, 35 Ill. App. 225 (1889), might
be included here if it were a "modern" case. There D and L were indebted to Gal.
They had Buehler certify a check payable to Gait and then mailed it to him; it was
returned without delivery to Galt and D took it to Buehler who canceled it and
recredited D and L's account. The court held for the defendant. See Ex parte Cote,
[1873] 9 Ch. App. 27, where the parties had an arrangement whereby one would
send bills of exchange to the other drawn on third parties, the recipient would then
send bills drawn on other third parties. D sent Cote in France a bill drawn on a
firm in Milan. Cote mailed a letter containing bills to D, but on learning that the
Milan firm refused to accept the bill drawn on it, Cote sought return of his letter
and its enclosures. The return was approved pursuant to French postal regulations,
but through a misunderstanding Cote's clerk failed to pick up the letter at the appro-
priate time and it was forwarded to D. The court held that the property in the bills
did not pass to D.
39 The court in Guardiant Nat'l, supra note 38, reached this result by adopting
the receipt rule generally; the court in Traders' Nat'l, supra note 38, apparently
took the course of holding the acceptance effective as to the offeror, but revocable
by the offeree.
40 The court in Dick apparently held that the acceptance was effective on dis-
patch but nevertheless revocable by withdrawal from the mail. Later Court of Claims
cases, cited note 23 .supra, however, proceeded on the basis of a generalized receipt
rule. See note 27 supra.
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to purchase the engine outright for $1,000. 4 ' Three others involved
sales of land,4' and one involved a lease of land. The subject matter
of all those contracts were things regularly bought and sold, and likely
to fluctuate in value, or to be the subjects of better offers. In one,
at least, 4 4 the reason for recall of the acceptance was a better offer
from another source.
Thus, the results of the relatively few cases " fall into a pattern
unlike the rationalizations enunciated by the courts. When the period
of transmission gives the offeree a chance to secure better opportunities
elsewhere, or to enjoy possible speculative gains, he cannot revoke by
withdrawing the acceptance; when such opportunities or speculative
gains are unavalaible or very unlikely, he may effectively withdraw the
acceptance before it reaches the offeror. A doctrine based on these
results would be more salutary than hard and fast adherence to either
the dispatch or receipt rule.
IV. NONRECEIPT OR DELAY IN THE TRANSMISSION
OF THE ACCEPTANCE
Before analyzing the cases between the parties to the alleged con-
tract, suits against telegraph companies, an offshoot with quite different
problems, should be considered. In these suits the conflict between the
dispatch rule and the receipt rule should be irrelevant. Nevertheless,
many opinions of the courts largely ignore the fact that something
different is involved in these suits. 6 A number of courts have
mechanically applied the dispatch rule against the offeree whose ac-
ceptance the telegraph company delivered late, or not at all, holding
that since a contract was formed on dispatch, the offeree's remedy was
against the offeror, not the telegraph company.47 Such treatment
4 1 Ellard v. Waterloo Mfg. Co., 20 Sask. 601, [1926] 2 D.L.R. 257.4 2 Morrison v. Thoelke, 150 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1963); Hayne v.
Cook, 252 Iowa 1012, 109 N.W.2d 188 (1961); Scottish-Am. Mortgage Co. v. Davis,
96 Tex. 504, 74 S.W. 17 (1903).
43 Geary v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E.2d 350 (1937).
44 Hayne v. Cook, 252 Iowa 1012, 109 N.W.2d 188 (1961).
45 In addition to the cases already mentioned, the Scottish case, Countess of
Dunmore v. Alexander, 9 Sess. Cas. 190 (Scot. 1st Div. 1830), permitted revocation
of an acceptance in circumstances where there was little danger of any speculative
harm to the offeror. The acceptance which was revoked was in response to an offer
of a lady's maid to serve the offeree. A later Scottish case makes plain that for
other purposes, e.g., revocation of offer, the acceptance is effective on dispatch.
Thomson v. James, 34 Sess. Cas. 1 (Scot. 1st Div. 1855). A New Zealand court
apparently held as an alternative ground for decision that a postal acceptance of an
offer to marry could not be revoked by an overtaking telegram. Wenkheim v. Arndt,
1 J.R. 73 (1873). The court, however, awarded only one farthing damages.
46 The same criticism might be made of some textwriters. See, e.g., 1 WLLISToN,
CONTRACTS § 94, at 342-43 (3d ed. 1957), where suits against telegraph companies
are lumped indiscriminately with suits against parties to the contract.
47 McKeown v. Western Union Tel. Co., 240 Ill. App. 559 (1926); Postal Tel.-
Cable Co. v. Willis, 93 Miss. 540, 47 So. 380 (1908) (the court refused even to allow
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leaves the offeree in a difficult position. In order to recoup the loss
he has suffered he must proceed against the innocent offeror. He has
to utilize a rule of law which many laymen would consider technical
or wrong. The victim of that rule may be an important customer or
supplier of the offeree. At the very minimum, such a suit will hardly
enhance the offeree's reputation as a good man with whom to deal.
Meanwhile, the party whose breach of duty is responsible for the
problem stands behind the shield of a technical rule of law to which
it is hardly entitled." Moreover, the shield may face but one direction,
thus leading to circuity of actions. The offeror who was to receive
the telegram probably has a good cause of action against the telegraph
company either on a theory of tort or as a third party beneficiary.4"
Indeed, he may even be able to convince the court that by his originally
using the telegraph to transmit the offer, the telegraph company comes
under a contractual duty to him to receive and duly transmit an
acceptance if there is one.5" Thus, in disallowing a recovery by the
offeree, the courts may simply be causing unnecessary additional
litigation. The rather obvious desirability of allowing the offeree to.
recover from the erring telegraph company in spite of the possible
applicability of the dispatch rule between the parties may account for
the relatively large proportion of successes by offerees before courts
purporting to apply traditional technical interparty rules." One
the offeree to show a business custom that acceptance was only effective on receipt) ;
Chesebrough v. Western Union Tel. Co., 76 Misc. 516, 135 N.Y. Supp. 583 (Sup.
Ct. 1912), aff'd, 157 App. Div. 914, 142 N.Y. Supp. 1112 (1913); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Wheeler, 114 Okla. 161, 245 Pac. 39 (1926); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
F. Connell Land Co., 61 Tex. Civ. App. 168, 128 S.W. 1162 (1910) (suit for broker's
commission).4 8 
It could be argued that these decisions are justified because higher rates would
result if the telegraph companies are liable, and that other telegraph users should
not be forced into such an "insurance!' scheme. The companies, however, have a
good deal of protection against broad liability under the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale, 9 Exch. Rep. 341 (1854). Moreover, this question is better considered with
reference to the validity of clauses limiting liability than with reference to the initial
question of liability v. nonliability. See generally Sutton, Contractual Exemptions
Fromt Liability, 34 AUSTL. L.J. 290, 311 (1961); Note, Contractual Limitations of
Contract Liability, 47 IowA L. REv. 964 (1962) ; Note, Limitations on Freedom To
Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YA.E L.J. 723 (1963).
49 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 105 (1963) ; 5 id. § 1019, at 107 (1951).
Z0 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Allen, 30 Okla. 229, 119 Pac. 981 (1911) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Fletcher, 208 S.W. 748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (plaintiff sent an
offer by telegraph to X, who returned a counteroffer by telegraph; plaintiff never
received the counteroffer; held that if plaintiff could show he would have accepted
the counteroffer he could recover against the telegraph company).
B1 None of the following cases is rationalized on the basis suggested, but the de-
cisions are consistent with it. Lucas v. Western Union Tel. Co., 131 Iowa 669, 109
N.W. 191 (1906) (telegraphed reply to mailed offer not effective on dispatch because
telegraph not an impliedly authorized means of communication since offer was by
letter); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Louisville Cotton Seed Oil Co., 140 Ky. 506, 131
S.W. 277 (1910) (court found that offeror had provided for actual receipt) ; Squire
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232 (1867) (only damage questions were raised
by the exceptions); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gardner, 278 S.W. 278 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925) (even though telegraph was the accepted method of transmission, court
held it proper to consider the prior course of agreement between offeror and offeree
that contracts would be formed only upon receipt of the acceptance).
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court has allowed the offeree to recover from the telegraph company
in spite of a conclusion that as between the parties a contract was
formed on dispatch.52 Moreover, analogous support for this result can
be found in several cases in which an offeree was permitted to recover
damages from the telegraph company for its misstating of the price
in a telegraphed offer, even though in the particular jurisdiction the
offeror would have been liable on a contract at the correct price.'
There is thus substantial support in the cases for allowing either
the offeror or offeree to recover from the telegraph company for its
failure to deliver the acceptance, on time or at all, irrespective of
whether a contract is formed between the parties by dispatch of the
telegram. It would be a salutary thing for contract law if the courts
would rationalize these results in terms of protecting the reasonable
expectations of both parties rather than becoming involved in involuted
discussions of agency problems.
5 2 Naive-Spillers Corp. v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 4 Tenn. App. 435, 442 (1926):
"[T]he plaintiff had a right of action against Collins Company for the breach of
contract, and also had another right of action for the loss against the telegraph
company for violation of a public duty and contractual obligation, as the injury did
not result from the intervening act of a third person, but the injury flowed directly
from the negligent act of [telegraph company's] . . . agents in delivering the tele-
grain to the wrong person."
5 3 Western Union Tel. Co. v. T. C. Davis Cotton Co., 170 Ark. 506, 280 S.W.
977 (1926); New York & Washington Printing Tel. Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Pa. 298
(1860); Pepper v. Telegraph Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S.W. 783 (1889); Postal Tel.
Co. v. Miller, 5 Higgins 544 (Tenn. Civ. App. 1914), approved, 4 Tenn. App. 442
(1926).
Williston cites five American cases against telegraph companies as squarely in
point for the proposition that "the offeror [is] treated as having made the offer in
the form in which it was received by the offeree." 1 WILLISTON, CoN Acrs § 94,
at 342 n.11 (3d ed. 1957). He cites fourteen cases for the proposition that the trend of
the more recent United States cases is toward adoption of the opposite view. Id. at 342
n.12 . His authority hardly supports the proposition. The five cases cited in n.11 were
suits by the sender and allowed recovery against the telegraph company. Des Arc
Oil Mill, Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 132 Ark. 335, 201 S.W. 273 (1918);
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chappelle, 180 Ark. 422, 21 S.W2d 964 (1929) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Flint River Lumber Co., 114 Ga. 576, 40 S.E. 815 (1902) ; West-
ern Union Tel. Co. v. Shotter, 71 Ga. 760 (1883); Ayer v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495 (1887). Four of the fourteen in n.12 were suits by the
sender, who was allowed recovery. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Anniston Cordage
Co., 6 Ala. App. 351, 59 So. 757 (1912) ; Jackson Lumber Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 7 Ala. App. 644, 62 So. 266 (1913); Penobscot Fish Co. v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 91 Conn. 35, 98 Atl. 341 (1916); Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Poons, 190
Misc. 110, 74 N.Y.S.2d 814 (New York City Ct. 1947), aff'd inein., 191 Misc. 1005, 80
N.Y.S.2d 28 (App. T. 1948). In four more, it was held that the sender could recover
very substantial damages from the telegraph company even though no contract was
formed at the erroneous price. Strong v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 Idaho 3g9,
109 Pac. 910 (1910) ; Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Schaefer, 110 Ky. 907, 62 S.W. 1119
(1901); Holtz v. Western Union Tel. Co., 294 Mass. 543, 3 N.E.2d 180 (1936);
Pepper v. Telegraph Co., supra. Thus, thirteen of nineteen cases cited by Williston
point towards liability of the telegraph company, as do, of course, the cases cited at
the beginning of this footnote. See also Estherwood Rice Mill, Inc. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 127 So. 2d 231 (La. App. 1961) ; Sherrerd v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
146 Wis. 197, 131 N.W. 341 (1911). The trend of results is then perhaps in the
direction of liability rather than towards use of either the dispatch rule or the receipt
rule in such cases. There is a good discussion of where the ultimate losses should
lie in 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 105 (2d ed. 1963).
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Turning to the mainstream of the delay and nonreceipt disputes,
those between the parties,5 4 strict application of the dispatch rule puts
all risks resulting from loss or delay in transmission of the acceptance
on the offeror.55 It will be helpful in resolving the question of alloca-
tion of these risks to consider the nature of the risks when an accept-
ance goes astray. The offeror thinks that there is no contract, and he
may rely on that belief. The offeree thinks there is a contract and he
may rely on that belief. Strict application of the dispatch rule will
leave the offeror's reliance and expectations 56 unprotected, and strict
application of the receipt rule will leave the offeree's reliance and ex-
pectations unprotected.
There are three possible functional arguments why the interests
of the offeree are more deserving of protection than those of the
offeror. It will, however, be seen that none of them justifies the
universal application of either an ironclad dispatch rule or an ironclad
receipt rule.
6 4 An apology is in order for the excursions into the tributaries of the mainstream
of this Article. Unfortunately, where the traditional approach of both courts and
commentators has largely been that there are no tributaries but only a single large
stream, an attempt to chart the stream itself requires some exploration of the
tributaries.
Z5 In addition to the more general reasons given for the dispatch rule, the reason
sometimes given for thus allocating such risks is that the offeror chose the means of
communication and ought to bear the risks of its use. E.g., Household Fire & Car-
riage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216 (C.A. 1879). It is, however, often
untrue that the offeror chooses the means of communication. The offeree in many
cases initiates the means of communications, as it is often largely fortuitous which
of the parties turns out to be offeror and which offeree. Note, 8 STAN. L. REV. 279,
282 (1956). The blackletter rule is: "The mode authorized for transmittal of the
acceptance is the mode used by the offeror to transmit the offer." SIMPSON, COx-
TRAcTS § 28, at 71 (1954). More extensive texts make similar although more elabo-
rate statements. E.g., 1 WILSTON, CONTRACTS § 83, at 273 (3d ed. 1957); RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 66 (1932). There are, however, a few cases which have
held, stated, or otherwise indicated that the person who first used the means of com-
munication which later went awry is the one who suffers thereby, whether or not
he is ultimately the offeror. E.g., Pepper v. Telegraph Co., 87 Tenn. 554, 11 S.W.
783 (1889). Other cases, however, follow the hornbook even though the offeree
started the use of the particular means of communication. E.g., L. & E. Wertheimer,
Inc. v. Wehle-Hartford Co., 126 Conn. 30, 9 A.2d 279 (1939) ; E. Frederics, Inc. v.
Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324 (1938); Butler v. Foley,
211 Mich. 668, 179 N.W. 34 (1920) (word allegedly left out of communication).
The argument is not a strong one even apart from its inapplicability to many
cases. If the natural and normal commercial way to communicate is by mail, it is
difficult to see why the risks of that particular means should be allocated to the party
who happened to use it first. This is equally true if telegraph, teletype, telephone, or
even radio is an ordinarily acceptable means of making deals. The idea doubtless
goes back to the days when the only normal way to make agreements was face-to-face,
with either the offeree or his agent delivering the acceptance personally. In a day
when contracts are often normally made through delivery of communications by a
common carrier who is really the agent of no one, the idea no longer is based on
reality.
56 The offeror's reliance and expectation interests in loss or delay cases are, of
course, his reliance on the nonexistence of the offeree's promise and his expectation
that there is no such promise and that he is therefore free of the proposed contract.
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One argument which has been advanced is that the dispatch rule
is better for evidentiary purposes. 7 There is some difference on this
score between cases of delay and cases of nonreceipt. In both situa-
tions the offeror tardily becomes aware of the alleged existence of the
acceptance-in delay cases when it arrives, and in nonreceipt cases
when the offeree or someone else so advises him in a subsequent com-
munication, at the latest in the pleadings of the case. Just as the
subsequent communication may come a short time or a long time after
the lost acceptance should have arrived, so the delay in transmission of
an acceptance itself may be a short or a long delay. But in one respect
nonreceipt is usually different from delay. Where the acceptance is
delayed the offeror knows that it was sent; from a postmark or from
the telegraph company, he knows usually when it was sent; and he
knows what it says. The evidentiary problem in delay cases thus is
little affected by the determination to choose one rule or the other
governing time of acceptance. This is also true when the acceptance
is never received.' In this situation, the offeror has only the offeree's
word for its having been sent, for when it was sent, and for what it
said, bolstered by whatever evidence the offeree has to support his
word. This is a heavy burden for the offeror to bear, but it is one
which he bears under either the dispatch rule or the receipt rule. Under
the dispatch rule the fact finder must decide whether the acceptance
was sent. The offeror's denial of receipt is one factor which should go
into that determination. Another factor is the likelihood that a letter
or telegram properly addressed, stamped, or paid for is delivered in
the ordinary course of mail or telegraphy. These two factors must be
weighed against the offeree's evidence that the acceptance was in fact
sent. Under the receipt rule the same factors are present, but the
likelihood of timely delivery now must be considered with rather than
against the offeree's testimony of dispatch. The fact finding should
be the same in either case. If the offeror's evidence of nonreceipt is
more plausible than the offeree's evidence of dispatch, then it would be
found that the acceptance was neither dispatched nor received; if the
offeree's evidence is the more plausible, then it would be found that
the acceptance was both dispatched and received. 9 Thus, from an
57 Professor Winfield has concluded that there is little to choose between the
two rules on this score. Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q.
REav. 499 (1939). This is a conclusion with which I agree.
58 For the purpose of this discussion, a case will be considered a delay case where
the offeror is able to secure a telegraph company copy of the acceptance. In such
a situation he has, practically speaking, received the acceptance, however late he may
have done so.
59 Without being unduly prolix, it is not possible to go into the intricacies of the
solutions to these evidentiary problems in the cases. Sometimes the likelihood of
receipt is treated as a presumption which cannot be rebutted by certain types of
evidence, see e.g., Barneby v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1933),
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evidentiary standpoint there is little choice in alleged nonreceipt cases
between the dispatch rule and the receipt rule. This is also true as to
content of the alleged acceptance, because even under the receipt rule
the fact finder will have to rely on what the offeree says were the
contents of the acceptance, for the offeror denies that there was an
acceptance, and hence is unable to say what was in it. Therefore, the
evidentiary argument, the first functional argument allegedly favoring
the dispatch rule turns out to be quite unpersuasive.
The second argument has more force. The offeree may in fact
rely on the deal's being closed as soon as he sends the acceptance, and,
since this immediate reliance is useful to both parties in the vast
majority of cases, it should be protected.6" But this argument carries
only to those cases in which there is or might be reliance by the offeree.
It does not justify the dispatch rule when it is clear that the offeree
has in no way relied.
The third argument, closely related to the second, is that the
offeree should be encouraged to rely immediately and, if he knows the
law, the dispatch rule gives him such encouragement. Such encourage-
ment to rely during the normal transmission time will tend to produce
results desirable to both parties in most cases, and therefore should be
fostered. But again, this argument carries only to those cases where
there is or might be reliance by the offeree. It does not justify the
dispatch rule where the encouragement had no effect and where it is
clear that the offeree has in no way relied.
Encouragement, however, is not necessarily limited to the normal
transmission time. The dispatch rule does more than that. Under
the receipt rule the offeree will be in doubt about the formation of the
contract whenever he receives no further communication from the
offeror,6 ' and this will be equally true whether or not his acceptance
and sometimes it is treated (as it should be) as simply evidence, see, e.g., Rosenthal
v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185 (1884); Rowntree Bros. v. Bush, 28 Ga. App. 376, 111 S.E.
217 (1922); Corcoran v. Leon's, Inc., 126 Neb. 149, 252 N.W. 819 (1934) ; Potts v.
Whitehead, 20 N.J. Eq. 55 (Ch. 1869) (court inferred from nonreceipt that the letter
had not been mailed). Moreover, the treatment may vary depending upon whether
the alleged receiver is maintaining that the communication was never sent or the
alleged sender is maintaining that it was received. See generally 1 WIGmORE, Evi-
DENCE § 95 (3d ed. 1940); 9 id. § 2519; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 87, at 280 (3d
ed. 1957).
60Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II, 48 YALE
L.J. 779, 795 (1939).
61 M. at 795 n.23, argues that the harm caused the offeree by the receipt rule in
this situation would generally be greater than the harm to the offeror by the dispatch
rule:
The ingrained usage of business is to answer letters which look toward deals,
but the usage is not so clear about acknowledging letters which close deals.
The absence of an answer to a letter of offer is much more certain to lead
to inquiry than is the absence of an answer to a letter of acceptance, so that
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is one of those relatively rare communications which goes astray. But,
given the ease of checking by phone or telegraph, the dispatch rule
hardly seems either necessary or adequate to encourage reliance after
the normal transmission time. It is not necessary because an offeree
who is hesitating because of worries about the mails is most likely to
pick up a telephone and find out whether his acceptance was received.
It is not adequate because, in spite of the rule, the offeree with genuine
doubts is not likely to go ahead and perform in reliance upon his right
to sue. Such action, if the doubts turn out to be well founded, will
not enhance his business reputation; nor do many people voluntarily
"buy" law suits. Thus, the third argument for the dispatch rule, that
it encourages reliance by the offeree,' is not completely persuasive."
The foregoing functional arguments do no more than justify the
dispatch rule as a starting point; they do not justify its inflexible use. If
I were to formulate a general rule to effect the purposes suggested, it
might be as follows:
Even though an acceptance sent by an appropriate method is
delayed or lost in transmission, a contract is formed (1) if by the
time the acceptance arrives or the offeror otherwise learns of it,
the offeror has not detrimentally changed his position in the belief
that no acceptance had been made, or (2) if, by the time the offeree
learns of the delay or nonreceipt, he has detrimentally changed his
position in reliance on the "contract." The burden of showing
the party bitten by the mischance has under our rule a greater likelihood of
being aware of uncertainty and of speedily discovering his difficulty.
No empirical evidence of the foregoing usages is offered, and one is accordingly
entitled to weigh one's own intuition and general knowledge in the scales in support
of or against Professor Llewellyn's conclusions.
2The encouragement argument of course presupposes that the offeree knows
of the dispatch rule, which will often not be the case. See, e.g., the limited survey
of Connecticut businessmen in Note, Offer and Acceptance in Contracts by Corre-
spondence, 59 YALE L.J. 374 (1950). Of ten business concerns interviewed, five had
never heard of the rule, and eight considered a contract binding only upon receipt
of the acceptance, some of them in spite of some knowledge of the dispatch rule.
63 A fourth possible argument hardly dignifies discussion. It is the opposite of
a conceptualistic position argued by Langdell:
Adopting one view, the hardship consists in making one liable on a contract
which he is ignorant of having made; adopting the other view, it consists
of depriving one of the benefit of a contract which he supposes he has made.
Between these two evils the choice would seem to be clear; the former is
positive, the latter merely negative; the former imposes a liability to which
no limit can be placed, the latter leaves everything in statu quo.
LANGDELL, SUM-MARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 21 (2d ed. 1880). In response to
the argument, it might be maintained that in more, cases than not the quantum of
risk to the offeror under the dispatch rule is less than the quantum of risk to the
offeree under the receipt rule. The theory would be that the status quo (i.e. no
contract) which the offeror believes to exist would less likely induce the offeror to
change position than the change of status quo (i.e. contract) which the offeree
believes to exist would be likely to induce the offeree to change position. Suffice it
to say that however sound such a statement of fact is generally, it is so far removed
from the realities of any one case that it should be ignored.
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change of position by the offeror and of showing the absence of
change of position by the offeree is on the offeror.
How does such a rule fit the reported cases? It certainly does
not fit the rationalizations of those cases. They follow the traditional
pattern that the risks of delay and loss are on the offeror, unless an
unauthorized means of transmission is used or unless he indicated that
actual receipt was necessary. But, if we turn away from the rationali-
zations and look at the results, we find them generally consistent with
this statement of principle. There is hardly a single case applying the
dispatch rule to loss or delay in transmission where it is clear both
that the offeree had not relied on the contract and that the offeror had
relied on its nonexistence." Moreover, in a large number of the
64 The following are the loss or delay cases (other than insurance cases) which
have held the acceptance effective on dispatch. In none did the offeree clearly not
rely on the contract where the offeror did rely on its nonexistence. Barneby v.
Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1933) (probably no reliance by the
offeree, but there was also no claim of a change of position by the offeror) ; National
Ref. Co. v. Wagner, 169 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1948) (oil lease delay rental clause;
court assumes dispatch rule to be applicable; no reliance by offeree) ; Gloyd v. Mid-
west Ref. Co., 62 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1933) (oil lease delay rental clause; no evident
reliance by offeror); Harvey v. Benmo Oil Cc., 272 Fed. 475 (E.D. Okla. 1921)
(oil lease delay rental clause; no evident reliance by offeror; heavy reliance by
offeree) ; Young v. Moncrief, 117 Kan. 698, 232 Pac. 871 (1925) (oil lease delay
rental; heavy reliance by offeree); Carter & Co. v. Hibbard, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1033
(Ct. App. 1904) (no claim of change of position by offeror) ; Baker v. Potter, 223
La. 274, 65 So. 2d 598 (1953) (oil lease delay rental) ; Farmers' Handy Wagon Co.
v. Newcomb, 192 Mich. 634, 159 N.W. 152 (1916) (one of the parties to a sales
contract had a right to withdraw up to a certain date; his notice of intention to do
so was mailed but not received; the other party relied heavily by performing the
contract) ; Powell v. Aldridge, 202 Miss. 648, 32 So. 2d 146 (1947) (acceptance con-
sisted of seller-offeree's shipping the goods) ; Logan v. Waddle, 238 S.W. 516 (Mo.
App. 1922) (reliance by either party extremely unlikely) ; Corcoran v. Leon's, Inc.,
126 Neb. 149, 252 N.W. 819 (1934) (clear and substantial reliance by offeree);
Watson v. Russell, 149 N.Y. 388, 44 N.E. 161 (1896) (offeror relied by filling the
acting job which had been offered to offeree; offeree relied by failing to seek other
employment for over a month just before the beginning of the theatrical season);
Howard v. Daly, 61 N.Y. 362 (1875) (similar to Watson); Trevor v. Wood, '36
N.Y. 306 (1867) (offeror relied by selling the 50,000 Mexican dollars involved; it
is by no means clear that the offeree did not also rely by refraining from trying to
secure the dollars elsewhere) ; Vassar v. Camp, 11 N.Y. 441 (1854) (offeror relied
by failing to secure the subject matter of the contract; it is by no means clear that
offeree did not rely by refraining from purchasing elsewhere in an ascending market) ;
Hitz v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 43 Ohio App. 484, 183 N.E. 768 (1932); McAlister v.
Klein, 81 Okl. 291, 198 Pac. 506 (1921) (offeree may well have relied on contract
because offeror's bid on steel work was one of a number submitted to offeree who was
a general contractor) ; Oldfield v. Gypsy Oil Co., 123 Okla. 293, 253 Pac. 298 (1926)
(offeror may have changed position by entering a new lease, but evidently this was
an immaterial change since the new lease was apparently conditioned on the termina-
tion of the old one) ; Washburn v. Fletcher, 42 Wis. 152 (1877) ; Duncan v. Topham,
8 C.B. 225, 137 Eng. Rep. 495 (C.P. 1849) (both parties relied; court accepted the
dispatch rule, but reversed a verdict for the plaintiff and granted a new trial on the
ground of a variance between the declaration and the proof); Naud6 v. Malcolm,
19 Cape of Good Hope 482 (1902) (no indication of reliance by offeror, but the
offeree may have relied); cf. Kays v. Little, 103 Kan. 461, 175 Pac. 149 (1918)
(heavy reliance by offeree). But cf. Peck v. Freeze, 101 Mich. 321, 59 N.W. 600
(1894). Peck is arguably such a case, because the court approved a dispatch instruc-
tion to the jury where offeree probably did not rely and offeror did. But in result
the case does not stand for this because the jury found in favor of the countermanding
19641
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cases applying the dispatch rule there was very heavy reliance by the
offeree.' The facts of these cases stand out in considerable contrast
to those cases applying the receipt rule where the issue upon which
the court based its decision could have gone either way, e.g., where it
is argued that the offeror required receipt of the acceptance, yet it is
not possible to tell whether the offeror had actually insisted upon re-
ceipt, or indeed if he even had the problem in mind.68 In the latter
type of case the use of technical rules, such as the unauthorized
means of transmission rule, obscures what the court actually did in the
case. The obscurity can, however, be removed by looking at the facts
and the results. Limiting our view to these "toss-up" cases, an inter-
esting, although not surprising, pattern evolves. In most of these
cases there appears to have been little or no reliance on the "contract"
by the offeree before he learned of the loss or delay.6" In several there
offeror. It might also be argued that Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng.
Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818) is such a case, but it is not. The delay there was in the offer,
not the acceptance, and was caused by an error made by the offeror. In Dunlop v.
Higgins, 1 H. L. Gas. 381, 9 Eng. Rep. 805 (1848), the dispatch rule was applied
in spite of heavy reliance by the offeror, but the delay was a very short one, and
there may have been reliance by the offeree in not purchasing elsewhere in a rising
market.
65 See the short abstracts of the cases cited in note 64 supra. In addition are
those cases involving insurance policies which authorize the mailing of premiums.
It is widely held that the policy is duly continued or renewed by the placing of the
premium in the mail even though it is delayed or lost. See generally 14 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7990 (1944). A recent case which probably carries
this doctrine farther than necessary to protect any reasonable reliance or expectancies
of the insured is Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 246 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958). Although there was no way the insured
could know immediately that the premium check had gone astray, it would seem
reasonable to hold him to such knowledge within a few months, since he should have
noticed that his check had never been cleared back to his bank account. The court
allows recovery even though the insured died about eleven months after he allegedly
sent the premium.
66 In some cases applying the receipt rule, the reasons given for the result are
clearly founded on the facts, e.g., the offeror had made it plain that he required actual
receipt of the acceptance, or the purported acceptance clearly was only a counteroffer.
Such cases are not included among those cited in notes 67-68 infra.
67 Keeler v. Dunbar, 37 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1930) (oil lease delay rental clause)
E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 58 Ga. App. 320, 198 S.E. 324 (1938);
Haas v. Myers, 111 Ill. 421 (1884) (offeree's only reliance, consisting of a trip
from Chicago to Billings, Montana, took place after he should have known that his
acceptance had gone astray); Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173 (1880); Elkhorn-
Hazard Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 20 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1927) (offeree
relied by immediately subleasing to parties undesirable to the offeror but this reliance
was unreasonable; the alleged offer was sketchy, with much essential detail left out;
thus, either it was not an offer at all or it had to be fleshed out by standard conditions,
and the standard conditions tendered by the offeree in evidence included a prohibition
of subleasing) ; Starr v. Holck, 318 Mich. 452, 28 N.W.2d 289 (1947) ; Kibler v.
Caplis, 140 Mich. 28, 103 N.W. 531 (1905); Egger v. Nesbit, 122 Mo. 667, 27 S.W.
385 (1894) ; Appling v. Morrison, 227 S.W. 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (oil lease
delay rental) ; British & Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson, L.R. 6 Ex. 108 (1871), overruled,
Household & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216 (C.A. 1879); In re
Constantinople & Alexandria Hotel Co. (Reidpath's Case) L.R. 11 Eq. 86 (1870);
Charlebois v. Baril, [1928] Can. Sup. Ct. 88 (1927), [1927] 3 D.L.R. 762; Public
Trustee v. Bottoms (Knauft Estate), 33 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 427 (Alberta 1960)
Smith v. Osberg, Ltd. v. Hollenbeck, 3 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 704 (B.C. 1938).
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was also heavy reliance by the offeror on the nonexistence of the
"contract." 11 Thus, the actual results of numerous cases involving
losses and delays in transmitting the acceptance give substantial sup-
port for the rule of law suggested above.
Before leaving the loss and delay cases, one further element should
be considered. Every bona fide delay or nonreceipt case is a mistake
case. Each of the parties has made a different unilateral mistake
concerning the same subject. The offeror had an erroneous belief that
the offeree did not intend to contract. The offeree had an erroneous
belief that the offeror in due time knew of his intention to contract.
The presence of this mistake element has been obscured over the years
by judicial and academic concentrations on establishing such things as
fictional agencies or nonexistent authorizations. Such mechanistic
68 Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 424 (1838) (offeror-seller, faced with an advancing
market, and not having heard from offeree, sold the subject matter of the "contract";
court accepted the dispatch rule, but held that where an offer arrived late on March 18,
an acceptance written March 19 and postmarked on March 20 was too late); E.
Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., supra note 67 (offeree claimed the
acceptance was mailed on March 1 ; offeror claimed that it was never received nor
had it been mailed; on March 2 offeree sent a letter which rejected the offer and
on March 4 a letter indicating that some things remained to be settled; offeree testi-
fied that the rejection of March 2 had been dictated before his acceptance on March 1,
and had been transcribed and sent by error, and that the letter of March 4 referred
to modifications in the agreement; after receiving the letters of March 2 and 4, the
offeror contracted to give the exclusive franchise in question to another party; court
held offeror to be entitled to an instruction that if the offeror did not receive the
alleged acceptance of March 1, the letters of March 2 and 4 estopped offeree from
claiming under the contract); Haas v. Myers, supra note 67 (offeror of a partner-
ship in purchasing a herd of cattle, after not hearing, finally raised all the money
himself and purchased them on his own account); Egger v. Nesbit, supra note 67
(extent of offeror's reliance is not clear, but he wrote that he had "made other
arrangements") ; Collins v. Hoover, 205 Mo. App. 93, 218 S.W. 940 (1920) (offeror
had sold the property in question) ; L. & M. Holding Co. v. Karp, 194 N.Y. Supp. 476
(Sup. Ct. 1922) (offer to enter new lease at expiration of old; when lessee did not
receive the new lease back he vacated the premises believing he was free to do so).
Only one case was found in which the issue was raised and the receipt rule applied,
even though the offeror had not relied and the offeree had. Bluthenthal v. Atkinson,
93 Ark. 252, 124 S.W. 510 (1910). In this case there was an option to renew a
lease, notice to be given 60 days before expiration; there was some reliance by offeree
in staying on past the term of the lease, but evidently the offeror did not initially
insist on payment of rent for the extra time; the offeree received the benefit of an
instruction to the jury about presumption of receipt, etc., and since jury found against
him it may be that it concluded that he had never sent an acceptance. The case
involved an offer which was itself part of a contract. The courts are more prone to
apply the receipt rule here than where there is only a bare offer, see text accompanying
notes 77-78 infra. In Central Guar. Co. v. Fourth & Cent. Trust Co., 244 Ill. App.
61 (1927), the court applied a receipt rule, in spite of some reliance by the offeree.
But the major portion of offeree's reliance had already been reimbursed by the offeror,
and even if a bilateral contract had been formed, by its terms the offeror had a right
to cancel the contract.
In the oil lease delay rental cases which held the risk of delay or loss to be on
the offeree, see note 67 supra, it is arguable that because of the highly speculative
nature of the oil and gas business, any period of delay causes reliance by the offeror.
See opinion in Canadian Fina Oil Ltd. v. Paschke, [1957] 21 West. Weekly R. (n.s.)
260 (Alberta 1957), quoted in note 77 infra. If this were correct, such cases could
properly be cited here, but where the offeror is obviously inactive during the period
of delay such reasoning seems incorrect.
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approaches have prevented the flexibility achieved by a patent applica-
tion of mistake doctrines. Of course, some of the factors taken into
account in mistake cases, e.g., change of position of the parties, seem
sub silentio to have worked their way into the results, but often only
under cover of some of the most dogmatically technical doctrines in
contract law. A frank recognition that a loss or delay causes a
species of mistake " would permit a more rational handling of the
cases. Such recognition is likely to become even more important in
the future because of the Uniform Commercial Code, which greatly
restricts two techniques much favored by the courts for giving relief
from the stringencies of the dispatch rule-calling the acceptance a
counteroffer 70 and finding that an unauthorized means of transmission
was used. 1
This is not the place to launch into a general discussion of
mistake in contract law.72 However, the point made before in con-
nection with revocation of offers in mistake cases " should be re-
peated here. If the court is convinced that the offeror relied detri-
mentally before learning of the acceptance, one of the objections to
relief for mistake is absent, for it will usually follow that the offeror
is not simply seeking escape from the contract for some reason un-
connected with the mistake. However, if the mistake doctrine is
utilized, astuteness will be required to avoid giving relief when the
offeror really did receive the acceptance or when he did not change his
position and is simply using the delay or nonreceipt as an excuse.74
69 The only authority found recognizing delay or loss in transmission as a species
of mistake has been in the law of oil and gas leases. E.g., Gloyd v. Midwest Ref.
Co., 62 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1933); 2 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS § 344, at 434-40 (1959);
3 WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 606.6, at 185 (1962).
70 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207.
71 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-206(1) provides:
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circum-
stances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting ac-
ceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances ....
72 See generally 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 597-621 (1960); PALMER, MISTAKE
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1962).
73 See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
74 If the mistake aspect of these cases is recognized, use of the dispatch rule as
a starting point will be more important than ever. If the courts hold that a contract
was formed on dispatch, mistake doctrines will give them much flexibility in adjusting
the respective interests of the parties. But if the receipt rule is adopted, the courts
will run into a conceptualistic barrier; no contract was formed, and the losses will
stay where they started. Nothing eternal prevents the courts from adjusting reliance
and expectation losses without benefit of a "contract," but anyone familiar with Anglo-
American contract law would not realistically expect such adjustment in any case
in which the losses cannot be squeezed into a notion of benefit to the other party
and thus brought under the restitutionary mantle.
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V. OCCURRENCE OF THE DISPATCH WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT
REQUIRED BY THE OFFER, WHERE THE ACCEPTANCE Is RECEIVED
IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF TRANSMISSION
What happens when an acceptance is dispatched before the time
limit specified in the offer but arrives, even though not delayed, after
that time? '5 The functional problems here are related to those in
the loss and delay cases but are not exactly the same. Once again the
offeree may rely on the contract, and the offeror may rely on its non-
existence. But the reliance of the offeror is much less likely than in
most delay or loss cases, since there is usually only a very short period
between the time when he may think he should have heard and when
he does hear. In fact, I have found no case in which the offeror
evidently changed his position during that period. Thus, the dis-
patch rule seldom is oppressive to the offeror in such cases. In spite
of this the cases are about evenly divided between those applying the
dispatch rule " and those applying the receipt rule.17 It is difficult to
discern any pattern in these cases. It is, however, sometimes said
that where the offer is itself part of a contract, i.e., in options, the
75 The problems of this section occur only when the offer specifies a time in
which acceptance must be made. If no time is specified, then the acceptance must
be made in a reasonable time. If the proper means of transmission is used, if the
acceptance is dispatched in a reasonable time and is received in the ordinary course
of transmission, obviously it is received in a reasonable time. Problems can arise
here, e.g., whether a reasonable time for dispatch is the same for a telegram as for
a letter if each is a proper means of transmission, see 1 WILLISTO-, CONTRACTS § 87,
at 279 (3d ed. 1957), but they do not relate directly to this Article.
76 The cases in this note and note 77 infra were all cases in which either rule
might arguably have been applicable. National Ref. Co. v. Wagner, 169 F.2d 43
(10th Cir. 1948) (oil lease delay rental; dispatch rule assumed by the court to be
proper rule); North Texas Oil Co. v. Fuller, Reaser & Co., 276 Fed. 708 (5th Cir.
1921) (alternative holding) ; Morello v. Growers Grape Prods. Ass'n, 82 Cal. App.
2d 365, 186 P.2d 463 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (option to purchase in a cooperative
contract; contract provided for "delivery" of the acceptance); Gorman v. General
Outdoor Advertising Co., 320 Ill. App. 339, 50 N.E.2d 854 (1943) (renewal option
in a lease); Kantrowitz v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 272 App. Div. 470, 71
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 991, 80 N.E.2d 366 (1948) (right to cancel
a contract during certain period each year) ; Reed v. St. John, 2 Daly (N.Y.) 213 (C.P.
1867) (renewal option in a lease) ; Baxter Laundries, Inc. v. Lucas, 43 Ohio App.
518, 183 N.E. 538 (1932) (alternative holding) (renewal option in lease); Falconer
v. Mazess, 403 Pa. 165, 168 A.2d 558 (1961); Bruner v. Moore, [1904] 1 Ch. 305
(1903) (alternative holding) ; cf. Holmes v. Myles, 141 Ala. 401, 37 So. 588 (1904)
(option to purchase real estate "for 20 days"; held that letter left at optionor's
residence on last day was timely, even though optionee's agents knew optionor was
out of town); State v. Agostini, 139 Cal. App. 2d 909, 294 P.2d 769 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956) (option to purchase in a lease; acceptance effective on dispatch for purpose
of determining whether state became bound by the contract during the fiscal year
authorized by statute); Campbell v. Beard, 57 W. Va. 501, 50 S.E. 747 (1905)
(acceptance effective on dispatch for purpose of determining whether the authority
of the agent of the offeror had expired).
77 Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Wilcox, 194 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1952) (option to
extend a lease); Wheeler v. McStay, 160 Iowa 745, 141 N.W. 404 (1913) (parties
entered a contract which was to become binding in 30 days unless one of the parties
sooner notified the other) ; Gasaway v. Teichgraeber, 107 Kan. 340, 191 Pac. 282 (1920)
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receipt rule is applicable.7" The merit, if any, in the distinction lies
in two facts. The duration of the power of acceptance in options
(oil lease delay rental) ; Brown Method Co. v. Ginsberg, 153 Md. 414, 138 Ati. 402
(1927) (where a patent license was to run from year to year, notice of cancellation
must be received, not just sent, before the beginning of the year) ; Cities Service Oil
Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961) (option in
lease to purchase; court explicitly leaves open that there might be relief for forfeiture) ;
Hoban v. Hudson, 129 Minn. 335, 152 N.W. 723 (1915) (sale of stock, giving pur-
chaser a right to recover the purchase price if he gave written notice of his election
to do so "on or before April 8, 1912; and time is the essence") ; McGrory Stores
Corp. v. Goldberg, 95 N.J. Eq. 152, 122 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1923) (renewal option in a
lease); Sasmor v. V. Vivaudou, Inc., 200 Misc. 1020, 103 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (dictum) (employment contract automatically renewable unless notice given
by either party by a certain date) ; Public Trustee v. Bottoms (Knauft Estate), 33
West. Weekly R. 427 (n.s.) (Alberta 1960) (other grounds given for result)
Canadian Fina Oil Ltd. v. Paschke, 21 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 260 (Alberta 1953);
cf. Haldane v. United States, 69 Fed. 819 (8th Cir. 1895) (the court holds that
where an offer provides for "notice," there must be receipt; holding is not strong
because there was clearly a rejection of the offer which terminated it before the
alleged acceptance); James v. Hutchinson, 211 S.W.2d 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948)
(renewal option in lease; held that offeror was bound by receipt of the acceptance
even though she did not read it) ; Spratt v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 178 Misc.
682, 35 N.Y.S2d 815 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (where stock is convertible by the surrender
of shares on or before a certain date, mailing the shares on that date is not an exer-
cise of the option to convert).
The question here should not be confused with cases where the problem is to
determine when a notice of cancellation starts to run and when the contract ended.
See, e.g., Oldfield v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 198 Iowa 20, 199 N.W. 161 (1924);
Sonotone Corp. v. Ladd, 17 Wis. 2d 580, 117 N.W.2d 591 (1962).
One type of oil and gas lease commonly provides that the lease shall terminate
if no well is commenced by a certain date unless the lessee shall pay a delay rental
by that date. Questions sometimes arise whether the payment must be received by
that date, or whether dispatch is enough. Cases of this nature involving delay or
loss in transmission are cited supra notes 65-68. A good statement of the basis for
the receipt rule in such cases appears in Canadian Fina Oil Ltd. v. Paschke, supra
at 264-65:
Having regard to the nature of the oil business and the fact that time is of
the essence within it, it seems to me that the privilege of mailing payments,
or what is more impressive, making tender by cheque, must mean that the
cheque arrive within the stipulated time. I cannot believe that the grantor
by these words intended to place himself in the position where each year for
ten years, with exploration and discovery at one stage or another of progress
all about him, he should have to wait perhaps for days to decide whether
the grantee had elected to abandon or pay. That would be the consequence
if mail alone constituted payment. Conceivably a letter could be mailed
containing a check to be borne by some primitive means of transportation
from remotest Africa or the interior of China, while the grantor waited
unaware of his rights and unable to protect them in the swiftly changing
circumstances which might destroy or enhance them overnight.
78 IA CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 264, at 521 (1963) :
If in an option contract the duty of the promisor is conditional on "notice
within 30 days," does this mean notice received or notice properly mailed?
It is believed that, in the absence of an expression of contrary intention, it
should be held that the notice must be received. As above explained, the
notice is in one aspect a notice of acceptance of an offer; but in another
respect it is a condition of the promisor's already existing contractual duty.
It is more likely to be regarded in this latter aspect by the parties themselves.
The rule that an acceptance by post is operative on mailing was itself sub-
jected to severe criticism; and even though it may now be regarded as
settled, it should not be extended to notice of acceptance in already binding
option contracts.
The foregoing statement is not limited to the normal transmission cases being con-
sidered here.
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is almost always a substantial length of time, whereas in ordinary
commercial offers it is likely to be relatively short. Since the offeree
has plenty of time in which to exercise the option, there is little reason
why he should not exercise it soon enough so that the offeror receives
it before the end of the period. Also, where the offer is irrevocable,
one of the prime reasons for the dispatch rule is lacking, namely the
protection of the offeree against the consequences of revocation.
These factors perhaps lend support to Professor Corbin's belief
that the parties are likely in such cases to think of receipt as a con-
dition to the promisor's already existing duty. On the other hand,
the reasons for treating options differently from bare offers are not
exactly overwhelming, and the distinction perhaps adds a rather useless
complication to contract law.7" In any event, in the hard cases, i.e.,
where there will be a forfeiture if no contract is formed, there is a
tendency to extend the duration of the power of acceptance beyond
the option period, providing the offeror had not materially changed
his position."'
One pattern is, however, discernible in these cases. Where one
of the parties has a right within a certain period either to rescind the
contract completely or to terminate it, almost all the decisions have
been that notice of the exercise of that right must be received within
the specified period."' Theoretically, more pressing reasons for the
receipt rule are presented here than in options to start or renew a
contract. When he does not hear, the offeror thinks the contract will
not be terminated and is likely to rely on that belief. In the new
contract or renewal cases, when he does not hear, he thinks that there
is no contract. But he may be less likely to rely on that belief since
79 This complication may get worse. How are "bare offers" which are irre-
vocable pursuant to statutory provisions to be treated? The courts already reflect
the heads-or-tails choice in option cases by splitting quite evenly in their decisions.
Gorman, Reed, and Baxter, supra note 76, were option cases in which the dispatch
rule was applied; Scott-Burr, Cities Service, and McGrory Stores, supra note 77,
were option cases in which the receipt rule was applied.
80 1 Wn.SToN, CONTRACTS § 76, at 249 (3d ed. 1957); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 35, at 146-47 (1963); 1A id. § 273, at 593-95. In addition to the cases cited by
Professors Williston and Corbin, see American Houses, Inc. v. Schneider, 211 F.2d
881 (3d Cir. 1954) ; Jones v. Gianferante, 305 N.Y. 135, 111 N.E.2d 419 (1953). In
Cities Service Oil Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104
(1961), the court explicitly left open the possibility of equitable relief against for-
feiture where the acceptance was dispatched before the end of the period and received
afterwards. A similar policy was effectuated in Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484,
147 A.2d 406 (1959), where the court held that mailing a notice of an accident met
the requirements of an insurance policy that notice of the accident was a condition
precedent to the company's liability for the accident.
81 Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Wilcox, 194 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Wheeler v.
McStay, 160 Iowa 745, 141 N.W. 404 (1913) ; Brown Method Co. v. Ginsberg, 153
Md. 414, 138 Atl. 402 (1927); Hoban v. Hudson, 129 Minn. 335, 152 N.W. 723
(1915); Sasmor v. V. Vivaudou, Inc., 200 Misc. 1020, 103 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct.
1951) (dictum). Contra, Krantowitz v. Dairymen's League Co-Op. Ass'n, 272 App.
Div. 470, 71 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1947), affd nem., 297 N.Y. 991, 80 N.E.2d 366 (1948).
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it may call for no action on his part. The trouble with this reasoning
is that the time in question is so short, often a few hours, that there
is in fact almost never any reliance in either type of case. Further-
more, if the reason for the result is that the offeror may rely, it would
make more sense to base the decision on the likelihood of reliance in
the particular case, rather than on a nebulous idea as to the likelihood
of reliance in a class of cases.
In summarizing this section it is not possible to draw much en-
lightenment either from the results of the cases, which are in conflict,
or from the judicial rationalizations, which also are in conflict. In
such a situation it is perhaps not amiss to suggest a desirable doctrine
which describes the results in at least some of the cases:
Where an acceptance, dispatched before the end of the period pro-
vided in the offer by a means reasonable under all the circum-
stances, is received in the ordinary course of transmission after
the end of that period, a contract is formed if the offeror has not
materially changed his position in reasonable reliance on a belief
that no contract has been formed, or if a forfeiture substantially
out of proportion to any reliance by the offeror would result from
the absence of a contract.
VI. TIME AT WHICH THE PARTIES ACQUIRE RIGHTS UNDER A
CONTRACT WHERE THE ACCEPTANCE Is DULY RECEIVED
This question has arisen often in insurance cases.82 For example,
A mails an application for accident insurance to an insurance com-
pany together with the premium for one year. The company
mails the policy to him. Thereafter A loses a leg in an accident.
Then he receives the policy. He demands the $5,000 indemnity
provided for loss of a leg; the company refuses to pay.
If the court applies traditional notions of contract formation, it is
undebatable, except in life insurance cases, that a contract is formed.
Even in life insurance cases it is arguable that a contract is formed
although the receipt rule is applicable and the insured dies before re-
82 In addition see the situation mentioned in note 1 supra. Other cases in which
time was important are F. A. R. Liquidating Corp. v. McGranery, 110 F. Supp.
580 (D. Del. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d 375 (3d Cir. 1954), upholding
judgment on remand, 140 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1956) (dispatch rule used to deter-
mine whether an assignment was made before executive order requiring government
approval of certain transactions with aliens) ; Tooth v. Fleming, 2 Legge 1152 (New
South Wales 1859) (cattle ranch was sold together with the stock thereon at fifty
shillings a head; held that calves born after the dispatch of the acceptance were not to
be counted in determining the purchase price) ; Meggeson v. Groves, [1917] 1 Ch. 158
(1916) (tenant of a farm prohibited from selling certain types of produce during the
last year of a lease; court held that the time a sale was made was the time when
the acceptance was handed to the agent who had delivered the offer).
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ceipt s3  But the question now posed concerns the time at which the
contract was formed: Had the risk shifted to the insurer when the
event insured against occurred?
The functional questions here presented are not the same as
those raised when an acceptance of an offer to sell something is lost
or delayed in the mails, when an offeror tries to revoke his offer, or
when an offeree succeeds in retrieving his acceptance from the mail.
In insurance cases the duties of the insurer do not call for substantial
reliance as soon as the contract is formed. Thus, when the insurer is
the offeree, s4 it is an offeree which usually neither needs nor wants
the dispatch rule,"5 and the reasons supporting the rule in other
situations 86 do not apply. Yet, there is authority applying the dis-
patch rule in these cases,sT thus suggesting that some interest of the
insured requires early protection even though the insured is the
offeror. This interest seems to be twofold. First, whatever the policy
application may say, the offeror may, in fact, rely on coverage from the
time he submits his application, dependent, of course, on a later finding
that at that time the risk was insurable. Second, in a great many of
these cases the offeror pays some premium with the application. The
insurer thus has the benefit of the use of the premium in the interim
period. Moreover, in many cases the premium period is calculated
from a date earlier than the receipt of the policy by the insured. The
insurer thus will receive a premium for that period.
The interests of the insured in early formation of the insurance
contract will be even greater if he is the offeree. Not only does he
have the interests mentioned in the preceding paragraph, but he also
may rely on the acceptance from the moment of dispatch by refraining
from securing coverage elsewhere. These multiple interests have
been protected in a number of cases.ss
83 See 1 CoRBIN, CONTRAcTS § 54 (1963).
84 More often than not in the formation of the insurance contract the insurer
will be the "offeree" because of the terms of insurance forms, but not always. Coin-
pare Phenix Ins. Co. v. Schultz, 80 Fed. 337 (4th Cir. 1897), with Pauley v. Business
Men's Assur. Co. of America, 217 Mo. App. 302, 261 S.W. 340 (1924).
85 Except in the relatively rare case of a suit by the insurer for a premium.
86 See text accompanying notes 11-26 supra (revocation of offer); 27-45 supra
(withdrawal of acceptance) ; 46-74 supra (delay or loss in transmission).
87 See Kentucky Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96 (1854); Hartwig v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Wis. 20, 158 N.W. 280 (1916) ; New v. Germania Fire Ins.
Co., 171 Ind. 33, 85 N.E. 703 (1908) (dictum).
88 See Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 50 U.S. (9 I-ow.) 390 (1850) ; Penn-
sylvania Lumberman's Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 126 Fed. 352 (2d Cir. 1903);
Schultz v. Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, 77 Fed. 375 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1896), rezd,
80 Fed. 337 (4th Cir. 1897) ; Cottingham v. National Mut. Church Ins. Co., 290 Ill.
26, 124 N.E. 822 (1919); Nertney v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 199 Iowa 1358, 203 N.W.
826 (1925).
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In contrast to the cases dealing with initiation of insurance
policies are those dealing with provisions for cancellation by the
insurer. Here, where the reliance of the insured on the continuance
of the policy is likely to be great, the insurance companies have had
an uphill fight in establishing the dispatch rule, in spite of explicit
language in their policies.
89
Nothing would be served by considering in isolation the many
insurance cases which have involved disputes over the dispatch rule.
The issues are too intertwined with agency problems, varying pro-
visions of "binding receipts," duties of the insurance companies to act
promptly on applications, and other issues,' ° to give a meaningful
treatment to this one small facet. Suffice it to say that, because insur-
ance cases involve an inversion of interests, coupled perhaps with loss
distribution notions, a proper analysis of them differs greatly from the
analysis of the other "time of acceptance" cases. Nevertheless, these
interests properly weighed may favor the dispatch rule.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the title of this Article suggests, it is not possible to come up
with a simple working rule for the cases considered, but certain
conclusions can be drawn:
1. Some problems classically considered as "time of accept-
ance" questions are virtually unrelated to those questions, e.g.,
conflict of laws problems.
2. A desirable balancing of the respective interests of the
parties cannot be achieved by a blanket application of the dispatch
rule, nor by the use of stare decisis to jump from one type of
"time of acceptance" case to another.
3. In a great many situations the dispatch rule is a highly
functional one giving the restitutionary, reliance, and expectation
89 See generally 8 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcICE § 5015 (1962);
3 RicHARws, INSURANCE § 531 (5th ed. 1952). In addition to the cases cited by Apple-
man and Richards, compare Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Stone, [19551 Can. Sup.
Ct. 627, [1955] 4 D.L.R. 167, with London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. v. Veltre,
56 Can. Sup. Ct. 588, 42 D.L.R. 79 (1918). The problem presented here is not to
be confused with cancellation by the insured in which the insured (offeree) is striving
for the receipt rule, sometimes successfully, e.g., Crown Point Iron Co. v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 127 N.Y. 608, 28 N.E. 653 (1891), and sometimes not, e.g., Nobile v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 536, 152 N.E.2d 33 (1958). In these cases the insurer (offeror)
relies little or not at all while the cancellation is in transmission, and there is little
reason, other than extreme loss distribution theories, justifying relieving the insured
from the bed of regrets he has made for himself.
90 See generally PATTERSON & YOUNG, CASES ON INSURANCE Ch. 12 (4th ed.
1961) ; Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy, 33 H. v. L. REV. 198
(1919). On the last point see Note, Insurance-The Effect of the Insuer's Delay
in Acting on an Application for Insurance, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 84 (1962).
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interests pf the parties the protection they should have; thus,
its wholesale overruling wpuld be destructive of a satisfactory
system of contract formation.
4. A frank recognition by the courts of the diverse functional
problems facing them in so-called "time of acceptance" cases would
serve in the long run to simplify the law of contracts. This asser-
tion by its nature is not subject to documentation. But one
emerges from a long immersion in the muddied waters of the law
as it is now rationalized with a distinct belief that the functional
approach wQuld bring more clarity and certainty to the law than it
now enjoys with the fictional obscurantism dominating "time of
acceptance" doctrines.9 '
1The RESTATEmENT (SEcOND), CONTRACTS §§ 1-74 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964)
became available for general usage only after this Article was in galley proof. It
has not, therefore, been feasible to consider its details here. A few general remarks,
based on a necessarily hasty perusal, are, however, appropriate.
I note with regret that the blackletter portion of § 64, Time When Acceptance
Takes Effect, is still worded as a unitary rule, except that it does distinguish between
acceptance under an option contract and other acceptances. The extensive comments
to the rule do, however, recognize the variety of problems to which the rule applies.
The contrast between the blackletter rule and the comments is quite startling. For
example, the rule says: "an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by
an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as
put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the
offeror . . . ." Comment a accepts the notion of the rule wholeheartedly where the
offeror attempts to revoke. But Corhment b suggests that the courts lean over back-
ward to avoid the rule where there is a loss or delay in transmission. "The con-
venience of the rule is less clear in such cases than in cases of attempted revocation
of the offer . . .and the language of the offer is often properly interpreted as making
the offeror's duty of performance conditional upon receipt of the acceptance." I
emerged from a reading of § 64 and the comments with the distinct impression that
the comments constitute a basis for some workable principles, but that the blackletter
rule continues to invite the application of obscurantist fictions. Maybe the American
Law Institute should consider publishing only the comments I
